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Logic and Formal Ontology: Is the Final Formal Ontology Possible?

Musa Akrami¹

Abstract

Many philosophers and logicians have contemplated the relationship between ontology and logic. The author of this paper, working within a Bolzanoan-Husserlian tradition of studying both ontology and logic, considers ontology as the science of the most general features of beings and the most general relations among them. He considers logic as the science concerning the most general statements of all (natural or artificial) languages and the most general relations among them from an inferential point of view. It is possible to see logic in a broader sense as the science of all kinds of relations among all kinds of entities, acts, and processes stating some (objective, subjective, artificial, or conventional) reality. These entities, acts, and processes are not individual; rather, they are idealized, such that their universals may be instantiated at all times and in all places. In formal ontology we search for the properties of those structures of the reality that are formally similar. So we may find some formal truths applying to all things and/or properties and/or processes in different areas of objective/subjective/fictional reality.

Surveying briefly the most important relations of logic and ontology in both analytic and phenomenological traditions, the author focuses on this central point: If reality is one as the unity of more or less interconnected and interactive beings of all physical, nonphysical and artificial types, the system of inference too may be one as the unity of more or less interconnected statements of all natural and artificial types. The universal system of inference may be divided into several relatively separate subsystems (having a more or less degree of connection) just as the unified reality has divided into several relatively separate fields (having a more or less degree of connection

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and interaction). According to such a model for corresponding realities and sciences within the unified reality and the unified science, the author assumes the possibility of beginning to construct both the comprehensive system of reference and the comprehensive formal ontology, both covering all possible members of their own field and being parallel and correspondent to each other; a long-run work, of course, very difficult to do.

Keywords. logic, ontology, formal ontology, Hussrlan formal ontology, comprehensive system of inference

Introduction: Philosophy and Logic

Philosophy, regardless of its literal meaning as “love of wisdom” has had different meanings according to different philosophers in the history of philosophy all around the world. It is possible to accept a definition that seems to summarize some common conceptions of the word: "Philosophy is a study of problems which are ultimate, abstract and very general. These problems are concerned with the nature of existence, knowledge, morality, reason and human purpose" (Teichmann, and Evans, 1). In the fields of inquiry enumerated within the definition above, philosophers investigate systematically the principles and presuppositions involved.

It is possible to show that, according to the definition of philosophy, logic may be considered as a part of philosophy or, at least, connected with it as a science providing with sound argumentation in any field or subfield of philosophical inquiry. Logic, in its most repeated definition (being studied in philosophy, mathematics, and computer science) has been regarded as the study of reasoning, reasoning in turn being “the cognitive process of looking for reasons, beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings” (Kirwin, 748). Collins English Dictionary gives definitions summarizing some famous conceptions of logic as “the branch of philosophy concerned with analysing the patterns of reasoning by which a conclusion is properly drawn from a set of premises, without reference to meaning or context,” or “any particular formal system in which are defined axioms and rules of inference,” as well as “the system and principles of reasoning used in a specific field of study,” and, lastly, “the relationship and interdependence of a series of events, facts, etc.”

(<http://www.wordia.com/logic>) These definitions remind us of different definitions given by both Western and Islamic philosophers.

Philosophers have studied logic, though they might have had diverse positions concerning the relation between philosophy and logic, from regarding logic as a tool of reasoning to regarding it essentially connected to both world and any knowledge of the world. Mathematicians have been interested in logic as the science studying of valid inference within a formal language. Studying the reasoning in different languages, from natural language to formal ones. Thus we inherited a variety of logics, metalogics, and theories of logics such as informal logic, formal logic, symbolic logic, mathematical logic, and philosophical logic, with their own richness in subjects.

As the inclusion of “the nature of existence” in the definition of philosophy shows, ontology (as the science of being/beings *qua* being/beings) is one of the most important parts of philosophy, for it studies the nature of, and basic categories of, being, or existence or reality in general. In ontology, one may treat the problem of existence of different possible or actual entities in different possible worlds and their possible or actual groupings in divisions and subdivisions in the framework of their commonalities and differences. Though pre-Socratic philosophers and Plato paid special attention to “being” or “existence,” it was Aristotle who introduced ontology as an explicit discipline in his metaphysics as the knowledge dealing with both the different meanings of existence and that which is common to all existing things. As one may know, Ibn Sina placed ontology, as the study of existence as existence (or being as being), at the heart of Islamic philosophy in which the concept of existence is a more definite concept than it is in Platonic and Aristotelian Philosophy. Ibn Sina distinguished between necessity and contingency as a basic distinction between Pure Being (i.e. God’s being) and the existence of all that is other than Pure Being, or, in other words, the distinction between the Necessary Being (*wājib al-wujūd*) and contingent being (*mumkin al-wujūd*) which relies on the Necessary Being (See, for example, Nasr and Amin Razavi, 70). Information scientists and computer scientists use “ontology” to refer to any description of a certain domain, reasoning about its properties, and formal representation of the knowledge using a set of concepts within that domain and the relationships between them. Gruber has explained

both the meaning and the rationale of the usage of the term: “An *ontology* is an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an ontology is a systematic account of Existence. For knowledge-based systems, what ‘exists’ is exactly that which can be represented” (Gruber, 2).

Various possible relationships between logic and ontology

Taking into account such a background, one may consider logic and ontology as two leading fields of philosophical inquiry in both its traditional and modern manifestations, having some interactions and overlaps in various problems. It has been an Aristotelian tradition to discuss some principles of logic in metaphysics, so that one may find comments on metaphysical treatments of logic in both *Metaphysics* and *Posterior Analytics*. In modern times, there have been various attitudes towards the relation between logic and ontology, varying from sharp distinction to essential interrelation. In his survey article on logic and ontology, Hofweber has tried to discuss some of the areas of overlap between the disciplines, despite the fact that “there is no single philosophical problem of the intersection of logic and ontology ... because the philosophical disciplines of logic and of ontology are themselves quite diverse and there is thus the possibility of many points of intersection” (Hofweber 2004). His approach helps to make this discussion possible. In the beginning, Hofweber distinguishes between different philosophical matters that are covered by logic and ontology, to be able to discuss a selection of problems arising in the various areas of contact between them. History of philosophy shows that different philosophers, from Aristotle to Hegel and contemporary analytic and continental philosophers have used “logic” and “ontology” in different ways. Of course one will not be able to survey the history of the various concepts of logic and of ontology. Therefore Hofweber focuses “on the already very diverse debate in the more or less the twentieth-century English speaking philosophical tradition” (*ibid*).

According to Hofweber, one can distinguish four notions of logic:

- (L₁) the mathematical study of artificial formal languages

- (L₂) the study of formally valid inferences and logical consequence
- (L₃) the study of logical truths
- (L₄) the study of the general features, or form, of judgments

In (L₁), “logic is the study of certain mathematical properties of artificial, formal languages. It is concerned with such languages as the first or second order predicate calculus, modal logics, the lambda calculus, and categorical grammars” (*ibid*). Subdisciplines such as proof theory and model theory are responsible for studying the mathematical properties of these languages. Much of the work done in this area these days is mathematically difficult, and it might not be immediately obvious why this is considered a part of philosophy. The roots of logic in this sense are in philosophy and philosophical foundations of mathematics.

In (L₂), logic “deals with certain valid inferences and good reasoning based on them” (*ibid*). The validity of inferences arises from the formal characters of the inference itself, so that this validity, or the truth of the conclusion, is rooted in the truth of the premises. Accordingly, the notion of logical consequence is the main notion of logic in this sense.

In (L₃), often associated with Frege, logic is “the study of special truths, or facts: the logical truths, or facts” (*ibid*). The logical truths are the most general truths, being contained in any other body of truths described in any other science. Logic, in this sense, is both similar to physics or biology (since it searches for a certain body of truths), and different from them (because it is more general than them).

In (L₄), as a historically prominent conception, logic “is the study of the most general features of thoughts or judgments, or the form of thoughts or judgments” (*ibid*). In this sense, logic is concerned with such general features of judgments as the subject-predicate structure of them.

Now, one may treat the relation between these four different senses of logic. There are many ways for connections between any couple of (L₁), (L₂), (L₃), and (L₄), as well as many ways in which four conceptions are quite different. The relation between (L₁) and (L₂) is controversial, while (L₂) and (L₃) “seem to be closely related

because a logical truth can be understood as one that follows from an empty set of premises, ... the relationship between (L₄) and (L₂) will in part depend on whether one thinks the logical constants themselves contribute to content ... and the relationship between (L₁) and (L₄) either comes down to the same as that between (L₁) and (L₂), if we understand 'form of thought' analogous to 'form of representation.'"

Afterwards, Hofweber gives a good discussion of different meaning of ontology. Among the various conceptions, one may select four conceptions as follows:

- (O₁) the study of ontological commitment, i.e., what we or others are committed to,
- (O₂) the study of what there is,
- (O₃) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,
- (O₄) the study of meta-ontology, i.e., saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the question it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.

The relationship between these conceptions of ontology seems rather straightforward. The second conception (O₄) is responsible for saying how the other three conceptions are to be understood. It seems that (O₁) entails that our beliefs commit us to a certain kind of entity; thus we must accept an answer to a question about what there is (i.e., O₂), otherwise we have to revise our beliefs. In the case of accepting the existence of an entity in (O₂), there would be questions in (O₃) concerning the nature of such an entity and its general relations to other things accepted by us.

Now, having the conceptions (L₁)-(L₄) for logic and the senses (O₁)-(O₄) for ontology, one may search for areas of overlap between these parts of philosophy. Hofweber shows the connection between formal languages and ontological commitment through meeting of (L₁) with (O₁) and (O₄), so that (L₁) is tied to (O₁) as one may find in Quine's explanation of ontological commitment the meta-ontological view based on it (See Quine 1948, van Inwagen 1998).

In meeting (L_2) with (O_2), one may ask that “is logic neutral about what there is?” One of the important cases of the ontological implications of logic is the logicist program “in the philosophy of mathematics, in particular Frege's conception of logical objects,” believing that arithmetic is reducible to logic so that “numbers are objects whose existence is implied by arithmetic. ... Thus logic implies the existence of certain objects, and numbers are among them. Frege's position has been criticized as being untenable since logic has to be neutral about what there is. Thus mathematics, or even a part thereof, can't be both logic and about objects.”

Hofweber deduces Carnap's rejection of ontology from a meeting of (L_1) with (O_4) and assuming the end of (O_2). As we know, Carnap tried to relate formal languages, ontology, and meta-ontology. He argued that, in formulating theories, scientists must use some formal languages as frameworks having clearly defined relationship to empirical evidence. Of course, Carnap held that there was no one correct framework truly mirroring the world as it is in itself, so that any preference of one framework over another is a practical problem. (Carnap 1956b)

There would be a correspondence between the structure of thought and the structure of reality according to meeting (L_4) with (O_3), so that one may argue that “there is a striking similarity between the most general forms of thought and the most general features of what there is.” Of course, one ought to give a plausible philosophical explanation for such a supposed correspondence between thoughts and the realities of the external world. Moreover, one must explain the “structural similarity between the general features of thought and the general features of reality.” This has its special history, from Parmenides to Kant and Hegel.

Logic and Formal ontology

In information science, formal ontologies have been built through a variety of difficult attempts to conceptualize reality. Trying to get a view of reality independent from domain and application urges one to make use of axioms to define the structure of ontology and build a formal ontology. Using a specific comprehensive conception of ontology, such ontologies are established on some formal foundation

ontology (or upper-level ontology, or top-level ontology) that treats general concepts being the same across all domains. Such an ontology supports the broad semantic interoperability between many different ontologies falling "under" it. It may be considered as a hierarchy of entities and rules, that tries to describe the general entities belonging to all domains, providing consistency control for ontology, so that one would be able to keep away any wrong ontological assumptions in the process of modeling a large-scale ontology.

Here is place that we come to "formal ontology" through meeting (L_1) with (O_2) and (O_3) in Hofweber's article on logic and ontology: "The mathematical study of artificial formal languages" is applied to "the study of what there is" and "the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways." Within such a conception of the term, a formal ontologist tries to give a mathematical theory of, or formulate mathematically the properties as well as the relations of, the entities in a domain, making use of proper axioms within a system of formal logic, like, for example, a form of the lambda calculus first order logic. Of course, formal ontologies are indifferent to what entities actually exist. No formal ontology comments on the certain things as the entities of a domain. They simply comment on the kinds of entities and their relations. It is the experience of reality that shows which entities there are. Hofweber sets forth three kinds of formal ontologies: representational (a framework representing information), descriptive (describing a certain domain of entities), and systematic (giving systematic theories of what there is, as well as relating all entities of a certain kind to each other).

Formal ontology was originated from a combination of logic and ontology. Historically speaking, the idea of formal ontology was brought about around the turn of twentieth century "in the work of Edmund Husserl. It coincides in many respects with ... attempts to use formal methods to solve classical philosophical problems relating to the notions of being, object, state of affairs, existence, property, relation, universal, particular, substance, accident, part, boundary, measure, causality, and so on" (Poli and Simons, vii). Husserl was interested in formal treatment of the fundamental questions of ontology. He invented new tools of logic for use within this field of philosophical investigation. "Through Husserl's younger colleague,

Roman Ingarden, and in the light of related ideas of Lesniewski and other members of Lwow-Warsaw School, these ideas spread rapidly, particularly in the Polish scientific community” (Faye, Scheffler and Urchs, 11). Such a project may be seen as a long and ambitious one with its own peculiarities. “Formal ontology, then, is to result in a Leibnizian *characteristica universalis*, a great mirror, which will reflect all of the various existential, formal and material moments possessed by all of the various different kinds of beings which there are in the universe. Consideration of the history of formal ontology from the *Tractatus* through Carnap and Bermann to, say, Davidson and Cocchiarella, would raise, is whether the *logical* analysis of event/action discourse ought not to be recognised as having a methodologically secondary role in relation to the direct *ontological* analysis of events/actions as such. ...The task of formal ontology, then, is to provide a formal logical language, a great mirror, which is sufficiently fine to reflect all of the distinctions which this laminated ontological space involves.” (Smith 1978)

Surveying the history of formal ontology, it is possible to distinguish between main conceptions of the term used by leading authors. One may select two main interpretations among various ones: 1) analytic interpretation, “entirely in keeping with the mainstream of contemporary philosophy ...as that branch of ontology which is analyzed within the framework of formal logic” (Poli 1993, 1), with Nino Cocchiarella as its leading exponent, who has written that “metaphysics ...--or what we might instead call formal ontology--is concerned with the study and development of alternative formalizations regarding the systematic co-ordination of all the 'modes' or 'categories of being' under the most general laws” (Cocchiarella, 30). According to this interpretation, formal ontology is the study of “the logical characteristics of predication and the various theories of universals;” 2) phenomenological interpretation, “developed from Husserl's early works, in particular *Logical investigations*” (Poli 1993, 1), mainly addressing, roughly speaking, the problems of parts and wholes and of dependence. “Despite their differences, these two varieties of formal ontology quite frequently overlap each other, although to date there has been no systematic study of the categories and layers that constitute formal ontology and no systematic analysis of the issues addressed by it” (Poli 1993, 2).

Kinds of Formal Ontology

In reflecting on the kinds of formal ontology, first of all “it is necessary to distinguish the use of the term ‘formal ontology’ on the part of analytic philosophical logicians such as Cocchiarella from Ingarden’s use in [his] StEW [= *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*], even though there is a welcome overlap between the two sets of activities”(Smith 1978, n. 11). While is used in analytic philosophy implying the use of *formal methods*, Ingarden divided ontology into formal, existential, and material ontology, in accordance with the type of ontological moments on the side of the entities studied. Entities “may be *formal* (differences, e.g. between individual and higher-order objects, their properties and relations, and the states of affairs they co-constitute); *existential* (where we distinguish between various mode of being, e.g. real, ideal, or purely intentional being); or *material*, (a matter of temporality, causality, etc.)” (*ibid*). Although there is no incompatibility between these two approaches, it is clear that “the idea of a formal ontology is placed in a network of conceptual oppositions: it admits of different senses according to which of its two constituent elements is given priority. If the emphasis is placed on ‘ontology’ then the principal distinction is between ‘formal’ and ‘material’ (that is between ‘formal ontology’ and ‘material ontology’); if instead the emphasis falls on ‘formal’, the contrast is between ‘ontology’ and ‘logic’ (‘formal ontology’ vs. ‘formal logic’). This situation raises some important questions: When one speaks of ‘ontology’, how can its formal aspects be distinguished from its material ones? When we talk about the ‘formal’, how can we distinguish between logic and ontology?” (Poli and Simons, vii) Frege too has spoken (particularly in his “The Thought” [“Der Gedanke”]) of a ‘realm of sense’, a ‘realm of reference’, and even of a ‘realm of word and sentence.’

Roberto Poli has distinguished three kinds of ontology: descriptive, formal and formalized ontology, each of which having two appearances: domain-dependent and domain-independent. A domain-dependent ontology deals categorically with closed regions of being, while a domain-independent ontology may be properly called general ontology. “Descriptive ontology concerns the collection of such prima facie information either in some specific domain of

analysis or in general [but] formal ontology distills, filters, codifies and organizes the results of descriptive ontology (in either its local or global setting). According to this interpretation, formal ontology is formal in the sense used by Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*. Being 'formal' in such a sense therefore means dealing with categories like *thing, process, matter, whole, part, and number*. These are pure categories that characterize aspects or types of reality and still *have nothing to do with the use of any specific formalism*" (Poli 2003, 184; Poli's italics). Poli recognizes that the similarity between two terms 'formal' and 'formalized' is not so fortunate. Therefore, he suggests that it may be better to use 'categorical' instead of 'formal'. Of course, despite their differences, these three levels or kinds of ontology are not separate. In many respects they affect each other. Descriptive findings may bear on formal categories; formalized outcomes may bear on their twin levels, etc. To set out the differences and the connections between the various ontological facets precisely is a most delicate task" (*ibid*, 5).

Husserlian Formal Ontology

Logic, ontology, and formal ontology are interconnected in most of Husserl's works. For Husserl, in some Bolzanoan tradition, logic is a theory of science, being concerned with meanings, with the associated acts that instantiate the meanings, and, particularly, with the collections of meanings constituting scientific theories.

Husserl's ontology has paid great and lasting attention to concepts or entities such as categories, numbers, manifolds, universals, and propositions. His *Logical Investigations* is an exemplary book, containing most of his ontological ideas. The ontology presented in it exhibits a conception of a formal discipline of ontology that is similar to formal logic. A formal discipline applies to all domains of entities, being independent of the peculiarities the fields of knowledge and, therefore, separate from "regional" or "material" disciplines which apply to specific domains of entities.

According to a Husserlian conception of logic and scientific theory, it is possible to have a scientific theory whenever there is "an appropriate unity and organization on the side of the objects (states of

affairs, properties) to which the relevant acts refer ... so that the unity which is characteristic of the [scientific theory] must involve both (1) an interconnection of truths (or of propositional meanings in general), and (2) an interconnection of the things to which these truths (and the associated cognitive acts) are directed” (Smith and Smith, 28). Comparing formal logic with formal ontology in the Husserlian treatment, it is clear that “where formal logic relates in the first place to meaning categories such as proposition, concept, subject and predicate, its sister discipline of formal ontology relates to object categories such as object and property, relation and relatum, manifold, part, whole, state of affairs, existence and so on” (ibid). Accordingly, in building up the structures there is a parallelism between the concepts of formal ontology and those of formal logic, so that the process of construction of a structure has its own laws. Such a parallelism between two kinds of concepts belonging to logic and ontology, and their being independent of any specific subject-matter, allow us to understand the properties of any given structure in accordance with the properties of all structures having similar forms. It is not surprising that Husserl would argue that “certain branches of mathematics are partial realizations of the idea of a formal ontology in this sense. The mathematical theory of manifolds as set forth by Riemann and developed by Grassmann, Hamilton, Lie, and Cantor, was to be a science of the essential types of possible object-domains of scientific theories, so that all actual object-domains would be specializations or singularizations of certain manifold-forms” (ibid, 29).

Having the kinds of formal ontology in mind, it is better to focus on the connections between the formal and material on the one hand, and the connections between the ontological and the logical on the other hand. In introducing his distinction between formal and material ontology, Husserl asserts that the former is descriptive and involves analytic a priori judgments, and that the latter involves synthetic a priori judgments. In its most general sense formal ontology concerns itself with characterizing the simple “something.” Depending on how this “something” is conceived, Husserl adds, the “field of formal ontology should be the ‘formal region’ of the object in general” (*Formale und transzendente Logik* 1929, art. 38)” (Poli 1993, 2).

Material ontology has two interpretations: the genetic interpretation, dealing with the field of perception and its foundations, and the descriptive interpretation in which material ontology is ontic, concerning “the highest material genera, i.e. the material categories in which single ontologies are rooted (Ideen zu einer reinen Phenomenologie 1913, vol. 1, art. 75). The sphere of material ontology in this sense is the laws of non-independence which delimit the ontological regions. For the genetic interpretation, material ontology precedes formal ontology; for the descriptive interpretation it is the other way round (1913, art. 10)” (ibid). Here is the place that we are encountered with the fundamental distinction between formal and material ontology, i.e., the distinction between analytic *a priori* and synthetic *a priori*.

Some remarks and elements of a dream for the final formal ontology

There is no satisfactory detailed explication and explanation of different dimensions of Husserlian formal ontology, particularly of the stratified connections between material ontology in the genetic interpretation, material ontology in the regional interpretation, and formal ontology. In making any distinction, one must recognize the separation between logic and ontology, not confusing characteristics of formal logic with those of formal ontology on the one hand, and the formal meanings of the concepts used with material ones. Moreover, it is necessary to clarify the elements and capacities of Husserlian formal ontology to reach a point appropriate for deciding on the possibility of a formal ontology capable of both covering all possible entities in all possible worlds and, at the same time, unifying all of them.

In founding a massive structure such as formal ontology, one must pay a particular attention to the relations of language, reality, knowledge, logic, and ontology with each other within a network of mutual and collective relations. Language, in its both natural and artificial forms, reflects the relations between some real (objective/subjective) or fictional entities through the words connected to each other in some statements, having their own relations in the framework of a formal logical system of inference. Logic, as a system

of inference through reasoning, finds or gives the rules of such an inferential relation among different appropriate sentences of a language. The truth of the sentences is the result of their contents or their being inferred from some previous true sentences, whereas only their forms share in inferential processes. Different natural sciences deal with different fields of the natural reality. Given that there are some nonphysical fields of reality (from, e.g., artificial to spiritual) there may be some nonphysical sciences dealing with those nonphysical fields. Because of some weak or strong connections and interactions among all fields of (physical and nonphysical) reality as the parts of the spectrum of the unified reality (from some possible relatively independence to some weak or strong dependence), all sciences must and can have some connections and interactions with each other directly or indirectly, individually or via some interdisciplinary science, in the network of some multidisciplinary science or in the space of some (coming) unified science or super-science. Such an approach towards ontology and logic sets up some correspondence between them. This correspondence is not a simplistic one in the framework of some picture theory (of truth or meaning). Logic as the science of inferential relations among true statements (and encompassing some more or less related studies too) is done by mental agents through some complicated processes that cognitive science must elucidate without being trapped by some superficial psychologism. Such a looking at language, logic, and truth makes the net-like collection of true statements independent of the knower and the judger, allowing to begin the construction of both the comprehensive system of reference and the comprehensive formal ontology, both being parallel and correspondent to each other.

Now, having a general topographical outline in mind, I mention some elements possessed by an ideal final formal ontology:

1. All facts from all sciences (in the broadest sense that may be possible) must be stated in natural language in the form of a number of (true or false) sentences.
2. The most comprehensive system of reasoning and inference relating the appropriate sentences in some hyper-science or ensemble of sciences must be constructed for deducing some conclusion.

3. The appropriate symbolic/artificial language must be constructed substituting for natural language; this symbolic/artificial language will have its own symbols/signs and its own grammar, such that two or more symbols/signs may be combined to make a sentence; such sentences have the potentiality to be substituted for natural sentences (being true or false) stating some fact of some science or super-science.
4. Every natural sentence of a typical educated man in every science has its own corresponding symbolic/artificial sentence in symbolic/artificial language in the framework of its own grammar.
5. Theories of sciences appear as a collection of (true/false) atomic and/or molecular sentences capable of being put in the form of symbolic sentences of logic and of entering into a logical reasoning.
6. The sentences of the sciences relate things and/or properties and/or processes while sentences of logic are the forms of those sentences of the sciences. The theories of the sciences relate a number of (contentful) sentences of the sciences, while the inference systems of logic relate a number of formal sentences.
7. The sciences written in symbols or signs have their theories in mathematical forms relating things and/or properties and/or processes through some contentful symbols or signs that may interact with each other in a mathematical procedure of reasoning and deducing.
8. Scientific sentences are sentences not about individuals but about universals, or about idealized singulars as representatives of many particular sentences, each of which being an example or extension of the idealized singular, such that the subject of the sentence (being objective or subjective or fictional) is not a particular thing or process but rather a natural kind.
9. It seems that both logic and ontology are to be considered *a priori* as long as they are formal. Entrance of empirical material-evidence makes them *a posteriori*. These two categories, namely *a priori* and *a posteriori*, render such evidence analytic and synthetic respectfully.

10. Sentences of the science are contentful, having their own empirical evidence as their contents. So they are synthetic (true or false) propositions. Only the forms deduced from the forms are *a priori* and analytic irrespective of their contents.
11. It is not possible to find the formal truths of formal ontology from experiences referring to the objective world.

Some Questions concerning the possibility of the final logic and the final formal ontology

- 1) Do the sentences in question appear in the logical system of reasoning formal and content-neutral?
- 2) What is the relation between formal sentences of logic and contentful sentences of sciences?
- 3) Is ontology contentful or devoid of content?
- 4) There are some rules for logical inference and there will be some other rules in the future. Are these rules arbitrary or they are law-governed. What are these possible laws? Are they arbitrary or natural-necessary? What about ontological relations?
- 5) Are all ontological sentences capable of being put into logical sentences?
- 6) Are we allowed to think that logic is the general system of inference of some new sentence (as conclusion) from some sentences (as premises) in a (natural/artificial) language, each sentence relating certain things and/or properties and/or processes (or relating certain signs as being capable of representing things and/or properties and/or processes) to each other?
- 7) Are we able to enumerate all possible sentences in a natural or artificial language relating different things and/or properties and/or processes?
- 8) If so, is it possible to consider it as abstraction of all types of the relations between all different things and/or properties and/or processes?
- 9) In formal ontology we may search for the properties of those structures that are formally similar. What are these structures? What is the meaning of "formally similar"? Is it

possible to find such structures and their properties? What will be the difference between formal sentences of logic and sentences of such formal ontology?

- 10) Are we entitled to regard mathematical reasoning as special case of general logical reasoning from a universal formal-ontological point of view?
- 11) Within the framework of parallelism of logic and ontology, is it plausible to regard both logic and formal ontology *a priori* in the same sense?
- 12) Are there formal truths of both logic and formal ontology? Does formalness cause them to be applied to all things and/or properties and/or processes?
- 13) Given that our formal ontology has been built, is it really *a priori*? It may be formal, but how have the formal truths of formal ontology been found?
- 14) Are we allowed to say that the possibility of achieving the most comprehensive symbolic system of inference is to be considered as achieving the *Logica Universalis*?

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Mulla Sadra's Theory of Substantial Motion¹

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Abstract

One of the most important philosophical theories of Mulla Sadra is substantial motion, which has greatly influenced other philosophical discussions. In this article, first we refer to the historical background of the theory before Mulla Sadra, namely in Peripatetic Philosophy, and then deal with Mulla Sadra's innovations, such as transferring the discussion of motion from natural philosophy to metaphysics, explaining clearly substantial motion, stating the five important arguments for the theory, and finally showing its main philosophical results like the explanation of God's creation, the reality of time, origination of the material world, the relation of the originated to pre-eternal being, the unity of the world, and proving God's existence and the Resurrection.

Key words: Mulla Sadra, Transcendental Philosophy, motion, substantial motion, metaphysics, Peripatetic Philosophy.

1. Introduction

One of the innovative views of Mulla Sadra is the theory of substantial motion in which he presents a new interpretation of motion

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in general, which differs considerably from Aristotelian theory. Mulla Sadra's words in defense of substantial motion in the frame of Neoplatonic context deserve careful consideration. Emphasizing the importance of the theory, followers of this philosopher today believe that it affects other philosophical discussions greatly. It can be said that this theory is one of the basic principles of Mulla Sadra's ontology and cosmology; in this theory, he offers a new philosophical explanation of natural and metaphysical discussions, such as the temporal origination of the world, continual creation, the relation of the changeable to the unchanging, the relation of temporal contingent to the pre-eternal, the relation of the body to the soul, and resurrection of the body. In fact, the theory of substantial motion is a connecting link of the Origin and the End. By explaining the theory and its arguments, we analyze its metaphysical results.

2. Historical Background

Pre-Socratic philosophers have paid careful attention to the problem of stability and change. Considering the criterion of acceptance or rejection of change, we can divide these ancient philosophers into two groups. On the one side, Heraclitus says that nothing is stable, and all things are in motion constantly. He holds that the only stable thing in this world is that every thing is constantly changing. He likens the world to a river whose water is ever flowing and argues that everything that is seen exists from one view and does not exist from another view. He says, "In fact the one only exists in the tension of opposites: This tension is essential to the unity of the one ... We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away through strife." (Copleston: 1962, 1: 39-40) On the other side, Parmenides and his followers deny any kind of change and hold that becoming or change is illusion. (Ibid: 48) From an intellectual perspective, change and motion are impossible. Zeno, a disciple of Parmenides, offers some arguments to prove that change is an illusion and is even impossible. (Ibid: 55-58; Aristotle: 1984, *Physics*: 239B)

The opposition of these two currents of thought leads to this paradox that if a thing changes, it cannot remain the same thing, but if it keeps its identity, it cannot change. It is quite clear that in the first

case, the subject of motion and change will not endure, and in the second case, if a thing keeps its identity, no change occurs. So, either change is accepted and identity is rejected, or vice versa. Both mentioned currents of thoughts face this dilemma, and each one has chosen a side and admitted its corollaries. Heraclitus accepted changing at the price of denying the identity of a thing, but Parmenides kept the identity and stability of things at the price of rejecting any changing or motion.

It is obvious that common sense does not completely accept either position. Accepting such a position, Aristotle believes that some things remain as they are while they change accidentally. Accordingly he distinguishes between two kinds of change. The first change does not allow a thing to remain as it is when that change occurs. He considers this change an instantaneous or substantial change and calls it “generation and corruption.” The second is the change that by its occurrence the thing stays as it is. Such a change is gradual and is called motion. So motion is a gradual change in time.

Aristotle argues that every kind of motion has an origin and an end; he contends that if all potentiality actualizes, the motion becomes rest (**Aristotle: *Physics*: 224B**). From this point, he reaches his famous definition of motion: “Motion is the first perfection for that which is in a state of potentiality qua something in potentiality” (**Ibid: 201A**). Therefore, the meaning of motion is understood by considering the relation of a potential and an actual thing.

In general, motion is determined with regard to its end. Its beginning, however, is either from that which is the opposition of the end of motion, or from middle limit which is situated between the end of motion and its opposition. For example, if something becomes hot, it must have first been cold or at least warm. If a thing becomes dark, it must have first been white or a colour closer to white. Accordingly, every motion occurs in two oppositions, one of which takes the place of the other owing to motion. It is clear that, because the beginning and the end of motion are opposed to each other, they must be under a common genus. For this reason, the numbers of summa genera of motions should be equal to summa genera that accept opposition. Aristotle explains that, from the ten categories, only three (quantity, quality, and place) accept opposition; because categories are not reducible to each other or to one common

category, motions that occur in the three mentioned categories are also not reducible to each other or one motion (**Aristotle: III, 200 B; 201 A**).

Aristotle states that the beginning of each of the three motions is a privation of a quality or a position, just as the end of these motions is possession of that quality or position. So these two, namely, privation and possession, must belong to a subject that is fixed when motion occurs (**Ibid: I, 7**). For this reason, he does not accept the occurrence of motion in the category of substance, for no substance has any opposition. As a result, any substantial change into another substance cannot be a gradual change or a kind of motion; rather it is an instantaneous change or of the kind of generation and corruption.

Aristotle's followers have accepted his theory and even Ibn Sina has added "the motion in position." Consequently, the earlier philosophers, belonging to the period after Aristotle, have argued that the categories in which motion occurs are four: quantity, quality, place, and position. They have denied substantial motion, i.e., the occurrence of change in substance. Ibn Sina's main argument is that motion requires a fixed subject in which motion occurs. If substance itself changed, there would remain no fixed subject for motion, for the actualization of motion depends on a fixed subject that endures as long as motion continues (**Ibn Sina: 1405, 123-4**). Following Aristotle, he holds that the occurrence of change in the forms of things is in an instantaneous way. In consequence, the Peripatetic philosophers divide all existents into three groups:

Absolute, fixed existents that are immaterial.

Those existents that do not change gradually; however, instantaneous changes, namely, generation and corruption, sometimes occur to them. All material substances are of this group.

Those existents subject to gradual change or motion. They are the four accidents: quantity, quality, place, and position.

According to this attitude, motion or change takes place only in the exterior of the world of nature and does not penetrate its interior or substance. The substance of a thing remains stable in time, except on certain occasions in which it is instantaneously corrupted and another substance is generated.

Defending the theory of substantial motion, Mulla Sadra successfully challenges the earlier philosophers' belief in this regard and provides some arguments to prove the theory. From his point of

view, the entire world of nature is in continual change and motion, and there is no fixed corporeal substance. This theory has had considerable results in metaphysical discussions.

3. The Source of the Theory of Substantial Motion in Mulla Sadra's Statement

Mulla Sadra refers to some of the sources of his theory of substantial motion that are mentioned here.

A. The Quran and Prophetic traditions: Introducing the Quran and traditions as his main and most important sources, Mulla Sadra says, "The essences of all material, celestial, elemental bodies and souls are renewing, and they have fluid existence. This issue has become clear to me by meditating on the verses of the holy Quran" (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 110). He also says, "This speech that renewal of substance is a new doctrine in which no philosopher ['wise person' or *hakim*] has believed so far is false, for God is the First Wise One [al-hakim al-awwal] who makes this clear in His Book, and He is the most Truthful Wise" (Ibid).

In *Asfar*, *Arshiyyah*, and *Asrar al-Ayat*, he refers to some verses of the Quran on substantial motion (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 111; 1361, 230; 1363, 64; 1360, 86). In *Risalat al-Huduth*, after reciting some verses he says, "Among Prophetic traditions, there are many statements that indicate the renewal of substances and the transformation of natures." Subsequently, he mentions some examples in this regard (Mulla Sadra: 1378, 61).

B. Uthulugia: Mulla Sadra states that earlier philosophers and mystics have believed in the theory of substantial motion and discussed it in their books. He then refers to two paragraphs from Plotinus' *Uthulugia*, which, according to his viewpoint, express the aforementioned theory. The first paragraph is as follows: "Every body, whether it is composite or non-composite, and even if it has no soul or spirit, is not stable, for the body by nature is flowing constantly. If all bodies of the world have no soul, then they will be demolished" (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 111).

Mulla Sadra concludes that all natures are essentially changing and renewing, and what remains stable are souls and spirits. The second paragraph is as follows:

If the soul is a physical thing like other bodies, it will inevitably be renewing and flowing, and this causes all things to be reduced to prime matter or *hyle*. If things are changed into *hyle*, the entire existence will perish, for *hyle* does not have a form, while the latter is its cause and the cause of its actualization. Accordingly, if the entire existence is purely bodies, the world will perish, and this is impossible. (Ibid)

C) **Zeno:** Quoting Shahrestani's *Melal va Nehal*, Mulla Sadra mentions the following passage which he believes is a proof for substantial motion.

Zeno, one of the greatest divine philosophers, argues for substantial motion where he says, "Existents subsist and perish. Their subsistence is by renewing of their forms. And they are perishing, because the first form is perished when another form is renewed." Zeno also says, "Perishing is indispensable for form and *hyle*." (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 112; 1378, 62)

D) **Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi:** In many cases Mulla Sadra has quoted Ibn 'Arabi about the discussion of substantial motion. For example, he writes:

Confirming our view about substantial motion are Ibn 'Arabi's words in *Fusus al-Hikam*, saying, "One of the wonders of the world is that man is continuously developing but because of the delicate veil and the similarity of forms is unaware of it. As God says, '*They were given something resembling it*'" (2:25). In *Futuhāt*, he says that all beings are in continual motion in this world and in the Hereafter, because creation without a creator is impossible. The Essence of Truth continuously owns infinite words and attentions and God's words that '*what is with God shall endure*' (16:96) points to the eternity of God's intellectual words, which are eternal because of His eternity, although their bodily idols are infinite and perishable.' (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 112-123)

4. The Place of the Theory of Substantial Motion

Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina mentions the discussion of motion in physics. Their justification is that motion is an accident of the natural body, and because the subject of physics is the natural body to which motion and rest correspond, the discussion of motion must be dealt with in physics or the traditional philosophy of nature (Ibn Sina:1405, 1, 38).

Conversely, Mulla Sadra considers this discussion to be a metaphysical one, and deals with it under the title, “Division of Existence into the Unchanging and the Flowing.” The reason of changing this position is that from meditating on substantial motion Mulla Sadra has concluded that motion is basically an analytical accident of the renewing existence rather than its external accident; i.e., motion is not added to the renewing existence from the exterior (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, p. 74). Accordingly, contrary to accidental motions, in substantial motion the moved and motion are not separate from one another. Rather, a changing thing in every instant is other than itself in former and preceding instants, so motion and the moved are one thing: the renewing existence (Tabatabaei: 1410, 3, 69; Mulla Sadra, 1410, 3, 180).

From Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint, all beings are divided into two kinds. 1. Stable beings that have no dimension of time and cannot be measured by the criterion of time, and so they are not changed and transformed. 2. Renewing beings that are in a state of flux forever and have the dimension of time. Accordingly, in a fundamental division, existence is either fixed or flowing, which is like the other divisions of existence into cause and effect, one and many, potential and actual, temporal and eternal, and other divisions. These divisions are considered to be the essential accidents of existence qua existence; therefore they should be discussed in first philosophy. On this basis, Mulla Sadra has moved the position of ‘motion’ from physics to metaphysics. (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 20)

5. Arguments for Proving Substantial Motion

In many places in *Asfar*, Mulla Sadra presents some proofs for substantial motion. Three of these proofs are based on the relation of substance and accident, and the fifth is based on the reality of time. They are as follows:

The First Argument: Mulla Sadra’s first argument is based on the notion that the nature of substance is the cause for its accidents. He does not mention this argument under the title of “an argument to prove substantial motion;” rather, he presents it as “the relation of the changeable to the unchanging.” He holds that in relating a changeable affair to an unchanging one, the nature of a substance must inevitably

be fluid and renewing in essence so that motion would be the essential attribute of its existence. By saying that the cause of a changeable is changeable and that the chain of these changeable causes cannot be infinite, he maintains the chain of changeable causes and effects must necessarily lead to a cause that is changeable by essence. Also, since the cause of accidental motions is substantial nature itself, it is essentially renewing and fluid. The reason that the cause of all accidental motions is substantial nature is that these mentioned motions are either natural or voluntary or by constraint. The natural motions are caused by the nature of things; motions by constraint also lead to nature, and voluntary motions are achieved by employing nature. Therefore, the immediate cause of all motions is substantial nature. The conclusion of Sadra's assertions is that substantial nature is the reason for the motion of accidents, and the cause of the changeable is changeable; thus, the substantial nature is changeable. (Ibid: 61-64)

Mulla Sadra presents this argument in *Shawahid al-Rububiya*: "If nature does not own the state of flux and renewing in its essence, then giving motion to others through nature will not be possible for it, since it is impossible for a changeable to come into existence from a fixed thing" (Mulla Sadra: 1375, 324).

We may classify this argument in the following way.

The substantial nature of things is the immediate natural cause of the accidental motion of things.

The immediate natural cause of every motion is changeable.

Conclusion: The substantial nature of things is changeable.

According to A, the immediate cause of every motion including motion in quality, quantity, place, and position is the substantial nature of things; no motion is caused by the immaterial agent immediately. Although Ibn Sina severely opposes the theory of substantial motion, he agrees with this principle. Ibn Sina in its justification argues that nature is the cause of motion but the change that occurs in nature is not essential. That is, despite being stable, substantial nature is characterized by the attribution of change because of the elements that are imposed from the outside. These external elements differ according to the kind of motion, whether it is natural, voluntary or by constraint. For example, in natural motions achieving different degrees of proximity or remoteness to the end, in motions by

constraint meeting obstacles and weak or powerful preparatory causes, and in voluntary motions continuous generation of specific partial wills in every limit of distance cause a change and evolution in accidents. Thus, the substantial nature which is the internal cause of accidental motion is the incomplete cause of these motions and is fixed and unchanging by itself, while the complete cause of these motions which is changeable and renewing is the whole substantial nature and the external events and elements of accidents. When it is said, “the cause of a changeable thing is changeable”, by cause is intended the complete cause and not the incomplete one (**Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 65; Tabatabaei: 1362, 208**). But Mulla Sadra does not agree with Ibn Sina’s justification and says that the change and renewing of those external elements will finally lead to either a nature that is changeable and renewing in essence or to an infinite regress. The infinite regress is impossible, so it leads to a nature that is changeable and renewing in essence. (**Ibid**)

According to B also if the immediate natural cause of a thing is stable, its effect will also be stable and if it is changeable, its effect will also be changeable. This premise is approved by the principle of general resemblance of cause and effect. According to this principle, since motion is something gradual, its immediate cause must also be gradual, for assuming the stability of the immediate cause of motion necessitates either the disobeying of effect from the cause or realization of all the assumed parts of motion together, which contradicts the existence of motion. Evidently, both consequences are false, so the antecedent that assumes the stability and lack of changeability of the substantial nature is also false. Sabzawari puts this argument in verse as follows:

God’s emanation stops if nature is stable;
How does the stable relate to the changing?

He further explains, “Deviation of effect from the complete cause is not acceptable; so, if a stable thing is the cause of a changing thing, it will necessitate that all parts and limits of the changing thing be realized at once. Thus, the assumed renewing and changing thing would not be renewing but stable, which is paradoxical. Therefore, the substantial nature must necessarily be renewing and changing, not in its quiddity but in its existence. (**Sabzawari: 1366, 249**)

The Second Argument: The difference between this argument and

the previous one is that in the first argument the emphasis was on the causal relationship between substantial nature and motion of accidents, whereas in the second argument the emphasis is on the mere relation of accident to substance. As is known, the viewpoint of Mulla Sadra and his followers concerning the relation of substance to accident is different from that of Aristotle and Ibn Sina. According to Ibn Sina, the existence of accident is existence-in-itself-for-something-else, while Mulla Sadra believes that the existence of accident is a subordinate existence, in the sense that its existence-in-itself is the very existence-in-something-else. Thus, the accidents of any substance are the subordinates of the existence of that substance and are existent by its existence. So, accidents have no existential independence. Their relation can be compared to the relation of matter and form. Matter and form exist by one existence. Form is a cause for matter in the sense that the existence of matter is dependent on the existence of form. Here, there is no duality between cause and effect. Similarly, the substance and accident exist by one existence and the causality of substance for accidental motions does not contain any duality. It is more correct to say that accidents are the rays, manifestations and ranks of substance, and it is clear that the ray or manifestation of a thing is not separate from it and they all have one existence. Hence, since accident is a manifestation and rank of substance it follows substance in all precepts. Accordingly, if an accident is changeable, so must be the substance.

Thus, accepting motion in an accident is accepting motion in an existent such that accident is that existent's manifestation or its rank. Motion in this existence means motion in substance and accident (Mulla Sadra: 3. 101-102; Tabatabaei: 1362, 208).

It is possible to formulate this argument as follows:

The existence of accident is as a ray or rank of the existence of substance. The former has an existential dependence on the latter.

Any change that occurs in rank of a thing is a sign of change in the thing itself.

Conclusion: Motion in accidents is a sign of motion in substance.

The Third Argument: Mulla Sadra in his final view considers accidents and characteristics of a thing in existence to be among the ranks and rays of the existence of a substance. He contends that every corporeal being has an existence that is specified, determined and

individuated by itself and that the accidents of every being are the signs of its individuation (*tashakhkhush*). His predecessors believed that the accidents and characteristics of a thing are the cause of its individuation and that things in their specification and individuation need their characteristics and accidents. However, from the perspective of the fundamentality of existence these characteristics and accidents are not causes of individuation but rather signs of individuation. Sadra says, "Each corporeal substance has a kind of existence that requires some necessary accidents inseparable from that existence. ... Most philosophers hold that these necessary accidents are the cause of the individuation of the existence of that thing, whereas they are the signs of its individuation rather than its agents" (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 103). Therefore, different beings are individuated, specified, and differentiated according to their existence; it is because of this individuation of identity that their characteristics are different, and not vice-versa. That is why every being has only one unique identity, which has different manifestations.

On this basis, the accidents of a thing are the ranks and rays of the existence of a substance. Their existence is unique and they have personal unity. As this personal unity is an instance of continuous substance, it is also an instance of the various accidents, such as quality, quantity, place, and position. However, it is impossible for a substance to remain stable while there is change in its accidents (*Ibid*).

The difference between this argument and the second one is that in the second argument emphasis is placed on the subordination of the existence of accidents to substance, while in this argument emphasis is placed on accidents as signs for the individuation of substance, unlike the assertion by earlier philosophers that accidents are the cause and agent of individuation. According to this theory, what exists externally is the unique specified being from which the different accidental and substantial concepts are abstracted and if a motion is detected, it is related to this unique being. Of course, since these two arguments are based upon the external unity of substance and accident, they are very close to each other and can even be reduced to one argument.

The Fourth Argument: On the basis of the impossibility of the separation of *hyle* from form, Mulla Sadra presents another argument: The change and transformation of material substances are obvious; even those who deny *substantial* motion agree that material

substances change, although they consider this change to be instantaneous rather than gradual and to belong to the category of generation and corruption rather than motion. But substantial transformation and change cannot be categorized as generation and corruption, because such change necessitates that matter remain formless for at least an instant, for “generation and corruption” means that a matter loses one form and obtains another; as a result, in the interval between losing the previous form and gaining the next one, that matter remains formless, while actualization of matter is through form and it cannot exist separately or without form. When the impossibility of instantaneous change of substantial forms or generation and corruption is proven, the change must necessarily be gradual, and this is motion (**Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 177-178**).

In other places Mulla Sadra expresses the same argument; for example, in *Asfar* he says, “If there is no common boundary between water and air which is the warmest instance of water and the coldest of air, it will require that in an instance, that is when water transforms into air, *hyle* stays formless, which is impossible. This is a point upon which all philosophers agree and can also be proved by demonstration” (**Ibid: 4, 274**).

The following formation may be suitable for this argument:

The substantial nature is changeable.

The change of substantial nature is either instantaneous or gradual.

The change of substantial nature is not instantaneous and of the kind of generation and corruption.

Conclusion: The change of substantial nature is gradual and of the kind of motion.

Premise A has sensible evidence and no realistic person denies it. Premise B, an exclusive disjunctive proposition, has an analytic truth. Premise C is true because if the change of substantial nature or specific form were instantaneous and were of the kind of generation and corruption, it would necessitate that a matter remain formless for at least an instance, which is impossible. When the impossibility of instantaneous change of substantial form, or generation and corruption, is proven then this change must necessarily be considered as gradual, and gradual change is the very motion. (**Ibid: 3, 177- 178**)

The Fifth Argument: Mulla Sadra presents another argument to prove substantial motion on the basis of his view about “the reality of

time.” On the basis of the theory of substantial motion, he considers time as the fourth dimension of the body. In his view, temporality of bodies is a sign of a kind of extension in their existence, and time is the extent and quantity of corporeal nature, considering its renewing and flux. Therefore, corporeal nature has two extensions: one is gradual temporal extension and the other is instantaneous spatial extension. If corporeal nature has no spatial extension in its essence, it will not find quantitative determination with respect to mathematical body; in the same way if it does not have temporal extension in its essence, it will not find temporal determination. So, since corporeal nature, i.e. material substance is temporal it must be moving and flowing essentially. (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 7, 290)

Mulla Sadra’s demonstration is as follows: “No doubt, as the occurrence of a thing in time and in the category of time—whether by essence or by accident—involves the way of the existence of that thing, the occurrence of a thing in place and in the category of place—whether by essence or by accident—is the way of the existence of that thing. So, it is impossible that a spatial and temporal thing in its external existence and personal identity be separate from time and place and its existence be realized so that time and place make no difference for it” (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 7, 290). This argument can be put into the following hypothetical syllogism:

Every corporeal substance has a temporal dimension.

Everything that has temporal dimension is gradual, changeable and in flux.

Conclusion: Every corporeal substance is gradual, changeable and in flux.

6. The Philosophical Results of the Theory of Substantial Motion

Mulla Sadra and his followers come to important conclusions from the theory of substantial motion in discussions of cosmology and psychology. Some of them are as follows:

6.1 Continual Creation

Muslim thinkers have interpreted the theory of “Continual Creation” in different ways. The atomist theory of Ash‘ari theologians is one example of its intellectual interpretation. Another example is

the renewal of existence (*tajaddod-e amthal*) of mystics. The theory of substantial motion is a philosophical interpretation of the theory of continual creation.

According to what Mulla Sadra has claimed in this regard every being in this world is essentially contingent, but its contingency is by virtue of need, i.e., existential dependence; on this basis it is non-existent by itself. Mulla Sadra considers worldly beings as dependent whose existence is their very dependence and if their dependence to their cause is cut for a moment, they will instantly perish due to their essential and existential need.

On the other hand, since according to the theory of substantial motion every material being is changing and renewing in its substance and its existence in every moment is different from that of the previous moment, God the Exalted endows a new existence every moment and His will is always in the process of a new creation. In the common point of these two questions, existential need of all things and God's continual emanation, the meaning of "New Creation" or "Continual Creation" emerges. The identity of the world in its essence and in every moment clearly shows its dependency. It shows that not only in appearance and exterior but also in its existence and identity the world is in a state of flux. Indeed the existence of the world is nothing but dependence. Mulla Sadra quotes this holy verse of the Quran to confirm his view: "*Every day He is engaged in some work*" (55:29) (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 7, 284).

6.2 Explaining the Reality of Time

By introducing the theory of substantial motion, Mulla Sadra presents a new explanation of time. Before him, there were different views regarding the reality of time. Some regarded it as illusory. On the contrary, some others believed in its external existence. Among these some considered it as substance and others as accident. But the common belief was that of Aristotle, who had said that time is the continuous non-static quantity that corresponded to body through motion. At the beginning, Mulla Sadra accepted this view, but later he disagreed with Aristotelians and raised this question: What kind of motion is time the extent? Aristotelians believed that time is the extent of axial motion of the heavenly sphere round itself, but Sadra believes

that it is the extent of substantial motion of the heavenly sphere (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 123; 4, 220; 6, 304). Of course, in some cases he also considers time as every substantial motion and not only the substantial motion of the heavenly sphere (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 126). In the next stage he regards time as the extent of nature, and not the extent of motion, for according to the theory of substantial motion nature or the corporeal substance is the very change and motion, and time is the extent of this nature which is renewing in its essence when its essential priority and posteriority is considered. Therefore, corporeal nature has two extensions: one is gradual and the other instantaneous. The former is time itself and the latter is the length and width or the spatial extension of the body (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 140).

He adds that the relation of extent to extension is like the relation of specified to obscure things, which are united in existence while their concepts are different. Moreover, as continuation in three-dimensional geometrical form is not independent from continuation in the physical body, the continuation of time is not separate from the gradual continuation in renewing corporeal substance by essence (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 141). So, time is among the analytical accidents of corporeal substance and does not possess any independent existence from the renewing corporeal substance.

6.3 Temporal Origination of the Material World

Philosophers and theologians before Mulla Sadra differed on the subject of temporal origination of the world. Theologians believed in temporal origination of the whole world on the basis of religious texts. On the contrary, according to the principle that “every material phenomenon is preceded by potentiality and time,” philosophers held that the material world has no beginning; rather it is pre-eternal in terms of time. They interpreted the concept of origination taken from religious texts as essential contingency or origination. Since the criterion for the need of a thing for a cause is essential contingency, they consider the precedence of a thing to essential contingency as essential origination and correspond it with the religious texts. They believe that all effects whether material or immaterial are contingent in essence. Also every material being comes into existence in time except for *hyle*, which is pre-eternal in terms of time. Therefore, in

addition to immaterial beings, all beings of the material world are also pre-eternal in terms of time. They say that this statement that the whole world has come into existence in time contradicts the divine emanation and grace. This interpretation, however, is not practically accepted by theologians so that it becomes one of three theories by which Ghazali excommunicates Farabi and Ibn Sina. The earlier philosophers' theory persuades not only theologians but also some later great philosophers like Mirdamad so that he suggests the theory of contingency through perpetual duration to solve this problem.

Mulla Sadra claims that by the theory of substantial motion he somehow explains the world's coming into existence in time in a way that is in agreement with both the religious texts and divine emanation and grace. On the basis of substantial motion he both accepts the essential and temporal contingency of the world and rejects the world's coming into existence in time in the sense that the whole world has a beginning in time. According to substantial motion all beings in the natural world are changing in essence and their parts are continually coming into existence and extinction. Thus the whole world like its parts is coming into existence in time (**Mulla Sadra: 1410, 7, 289-298**). Elsewhere he says, "Since there is no whole without its parts, so the world with all its parts including heavenly spheres, stars, simple things, and composite things, is contingent and finite, and everything in it in every moment is another thing and a new creature" (**Mulla Sadra: 1410, 7, 298; 1363, 64; 1361, 230; 1360, 63- 64**). One must not forget that what Mulla Sadra means by the world is the material world, for immaterial beings that are somehow among God's attributes and Lordly Essence are eternal (**Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 108**).

It is obvious that on the basis of this view it is not possible to imagine a beginning point for the world; indeed, there is no need to suppose so. Because this is true only if there exists a time separate and independent from the world and then the world comes into existence in a specific time. But since time is defined as the extent of the substance of a changing thing, and not something independent, it is not possible to discuss the beginning point of the world, which consists of a collection of bodily substances. In fact, the world is timeless in the same way that it is placeless. Temporality is something that can be attributed to the parts of the world and not to the whole world. Actually, attributing time and place to the whole world is a

kind of confusion in categories. It is as if one were to say that the world is up or down. Therefore, it is nonsense to discuss the temporal contingency and pre-eternity of the world.

However, Mulla Sadra is proud of his ability to bring together the idea of temporal contingency of the world and continuation of divine emanation. He believes that it is his innovation and no one before him has ever found it. Even mystics have not found it through intuition and inspiration; only according to divinely revealed religion do they accept temporal contingency of the world and the complete causality of God (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 6, 327; 1375, 296). Nevertheless, it seems that his statement is not a bringing together of the views of theologians and philosophers, and like the earlier philosophers' views, it disagrees with temporal contingency of the whole world, but agrees with temporal contingency of every material being separately. The only difference is that Mulla Sadra's explanation of time is different from that of the others already mentioned.

6.4 Proving God's Existence

One of the arguments presented to prove God's existence since Aristotle is the argument of movement. But this argument has different versions, some of which are more profound and exact than others. Obviously one can say Ibn Sina's version is more complete and exact than Aristotle's, and Mulla Sadra's version is more complete than Ibn Sina's.

According to substantial motion, Mulla Sadra offers a new philosophical explanation of teleology of the natural world; also he proves the need of the world in its original existence to a creator. Although Mulla Sadra uses expressions as those of Aristotle and Ibn Sina, he intends other meanings that are different from theirs.

Aristotle's argument of movement merely proves the existence of a God who is the end for the motion of the heavenly spheres' souls. Such an end causes joy inside the souls of heavenly spheres, and as a result, makes the spheres themselves move. This statement is consistent with the belief in the pre-eternity and independence of material substances, and as Aristotle holds, the world does not have any existential dependence on, or need to the First Mover. In fact Aristotle insists that the First Mover is not an existence- giver, but a

motion-giver.

The viewpoint of Ibn Sina is different from that of Aristotle regarding the relation between God and the world. Accepting that God is the creator, and the world has essential contingency, Ibn Sina explains the world in a way that it is emanated and kept by God in every instant.

Mulla Sadra accepts this view, but the difference between him and Ibn Sina is in the explanation of this philosophical truth. He believes that by denying the principle of substantial motion, Ibn Sina cannot prove and justify the way of permanent creation of accidents and substances in the natural world, whereas according to substantial motion, matter is being originated and created in every instant. Such being is impossible to come into existence by itself, for matter is essentially in the state of moving, and without doubt, any motion or moving thing needs a mover. Now if all the material world is in the state of flux and moves continuously, then the creation of the world is the same as giving it motion, for the creation of the world is identical with the creation of motion, and its creator and mover are the same.

So, the creation of motion is the creation of the material world. The mover or creator does not originate the motion separately and does not let it exist independently. Thus, the result of substantial motion is that an immaterial essence brings the material substance into existence incessantly, and all states, accidents and concomitants are moving and changing along with the moving material substance. This is permanent creation. In this regard, Mulla Sadra writes: "Renewing of motions is dependent on the renewing of the essences of the moving things, and accidents are subject to the substance in their changing and stability. Thus the material world along with all things in it becomes extinct at every instant, and it is in need of God to become existent again" (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 6, 47). In another place, Mulla Sadra clearly declares that according to substantial motion, the mover, in fact, is an existence-giver rather than motion-giver, i.e., He gives existence to a thing the essence of which is in a state of flux and renewal (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 39).

Mulla Sadra believes that his argument of substantial motion not only proves the independency of the world upon the creator in its existence but also offers a new philosophical explanation for the teleology of the natural world and proves that the essences and

existences of all beings are the very flux and joy to reach the first source (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 2, 273- 274).

From this, Mulla Sadra concludes that the existents must have an essential goal; otherwise, it follows that the existence of joy and aspiration for finding God in their nature must be vain, whereas in the abode of existence, nothing subsists in vain (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 2, 201; 5, 204; 1363, 427).

6.5 The Relation of the Changeable to the Unchanging

The relation of the changeable to an unchanging existent has been one of the difficulties during the history of philosophy, which occupied the minds of many philosophers. In this discussion, two suppositions have been accepted among philosophers: “The cause of the changeable is changeable, and the cause of the unchanging is unchanging as well.” There is no problem in the latter proposition; however, regarding the former, a dilemma is raised that if changing beings’ end in the essence of God, this requires His essence to be changeable too, and if those beings do not terminate in the First Principle, then an infinite regress is raised. Both consequents are impossible according to philosophical principles. Because of this, the problem of the relation of the changeable to the unchanging has remained unsolved until the time of the advent of Transcendental Philosophy.

Mulla Sadra says that by accepting substantial motion this problem is easily solved, for if motion for a thing is not essential, the thing needs a mover, which in turn must be a moving existent. However, if motion would be essential for the thing, then as it is essential, it does not need a cause; rather it is originated along with the origination of the thing itself. There is no separation between the thing and motion. Thus when we say, “A changing effect needs a changing cause” this is only true when we consider motion or change as something additional to the essence of things. If such a conception is true, then it should be said that a cause must create the effect first and originates motion afterwards. Contrary to this, the existents that are essentially changing and their existences are the same as change, in this case, their creations are the very creation of motion in them. Such existents if considered as existences-in-themselves are stable, but if

the relation of their supposed particles to each other is considered, they are changeable. The stability of such existents is the stability of their renewal. What the agent gives is their 'existences- in-themselves', and not their relative existence. Thus, considering its stability, the world of nature relates to the unchangeable cause, and its changing attribute originates changing things (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 68; and 7, 285-292)

6.6 The Relation of the Originated to Pre-eternal Being

The relation of the originated being to the Necessary Existent Who is pre-eternal by Himself, so that neither infinite regress occurs nor God's affection, has occupied the mind of Muslim philosophers who were not able to solve it. By accepting Mulla Sadra's theory of substantial motion, this problem is easily solved. For it was explained that according to substantial motion, the world of nature though renewing and changing is also fixed when its dependency upon its unchangeable cause is considered. Now we can say that from the very aspect of stability, the fixed being relates to the pre-eternal being, and its renewing and changing aspect causes the originated existents. Thus, a being that has two aspects, and renewing or changing is essential for it, is an intermediary between the originated and pre-eternal existent. (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 68)

6.7 The Composition of Matter and Form by Way of Unification

Some Muslim peripatetic philosophers believe the composition of matter and form is by way of annexation. Contrary to this belief, Mir Sadr Al-Din Dashtaki declares that this composition is by way of unification: Mulla Sadra prefers this to the viewpoint of the peripatetics and explains it according to the gradational unity of existence and substantial motion (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 3, 283).

Mulla Sadra's followers believe that explaining and understanding the reality of the composition by way of unification, in the material world, is only possible by accepting substantial motion and the essential renewal of things. Sadr Al-Din Dashtaki, though, acknowledges that this kind of composition could not explain and prove it clearly and correctly, due to the lack of awareness of the gradational unity of existence and the theory of substantial motion.

Thus, the composition of matter and form should be considered one of Mulla Sadra's innovations (Motahhari: 1375, 74- 76; Ashtiyani: 1360, 55- 57).

6.8 Proving the Existence of Immaterial Forms

Mulla Sadra proves the existence of immaterial forms in different ways, one of which is the way of substantial motion. In his opinion, as every nature in its essence is continuously flowing and renewing, it needs a mover that gives existence to it. This existence-giver must be a fixed, unchangeable, and immaterial being, for infinite regress of the chain of causes and effects is impossible (Mulla Sadra: 1360, 160).

In his explanation, Mulla Sadra views every natural species independently and regards the world of nature as filled with species whose existence are ever renewing and changing. In the light of this judgment, he says that every changing and renewing nature needs an unchangeable and immaterial being, and as the world of nature has different kinds of species, the archetypes are also different and plural (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 5, 202; 3, 65- 96).

6.9 Proving the Unity of the World

In proving the unity of the world, Mulla Sadra uses a method particular to him. He proves in accordance with his theory of substantial motion that the world on the whole has a fundamental motion, and every being is a part of the body of this motion. Such a being like any other existent gets a new identity and accordingly needs an existence-giver to give its existence for which changing or flowing is essential. According to this interpretation, the order of the world is a personal one that has a fundamental and eternal unity (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 5, 342; 6, 98- 99; Sabzewari: 1410, 6, 98).

6.10 The Corporeality of the Soul in Temporal Origination, and Its Spirituality in Continuance

Mulla Sadra considers the soul as the product of the substantial motion of the body. He claims that the soul in its origination needs a material background, and by passing from the corporeal form, vegetative soul, animal soul, reaches finally to the rank of rational

human soul. All these stages have existed in its material substance potentially. The soul by passing the mentioned stages, frees itself from matter and potentiality, and reaches the state of immateriality, due to its substantial motion. Thus, the substance of the soul comes naturally after the substance of body and, in fact, it is the natural continuation of the body, so that human form is the final stage of bodily perfection, and the first stage of the perfection of soul. In this regard, Mulla Sadra states a very famous philosophical rule, i.e., “The soul is corporeal in temporal origination and spiritual in continuance” (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 8, 390 and 330; 1360, 223). Accordingly, the relation of soul to body is completely natural. Every body has its own soul, which is specific to it, originated in its background and is the continuation of its material movement. So, it is false to think that every person has a soul that accompanies him from the beginning of his life to its end, for the soul acquires perfection and actuality gradually, and its identity is formed step by step by its deeds and what it gains (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 8, 328).

It should be noted that when it is said the soul is the product of the substantial motion of body, it is not meant that the soul is the effect of body or it is dependent on it; rather it means that the body is a background for the realization and actuality of the soul. It is a substance that needs material ground to come into existence, but in its continuation and subsistence it does not need this ground; as Mulla Sadra confirms, “The truth is that the human soul is corporeal in its temporal origination and in its acts and deeds, but it is spiritual in its subsistence and being intelligible. So the soul’s acting in bodies is corporeal, and its intelligibility for its essence and also its agent’s essence are spiritual. As for immaterial intellects, they are completely immaterial in their essences and acts” (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 8, 347).

6.11 The Dependency of the Development of Human’s Knowledge on the Development of the Soul

Based on substantial motion, Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint about knowledge and perception is different from his predecessors. Propounding the principle of the unity of the intellect and the intelligible, he believes that the development of the human’s knowledge is dependent on the intensification, perfection, and development of the soul’s existence. In his opinion, the soul is not

fixed or unchangeable; it is not a fixed or unchangeable entity that accompanies man from its origin to the end, and only some of his attributes, like knowledge and perception, are changed. Stating a lot of objections against Ibn Sina's theory of the soul, Mulla Sadra insists that accepting the above-mentioned issues about the soul is only reasonable when one accepts the principles of the Transcendental Philosophy, and rejects some principles of the peripatetics in this regard (Mulla Sadra, 1410, 3, 322).

Unlike Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra considers knowledge or perception as a movement from potentiality to actuality, and an ascent to a status by which the perceiver transcends his existential level and reaches the existential status of the perceived; in Mulla Sadra's interpretation, the intellect is united with the intelligible. He also maintains that the soul in the process of knowing does not merely have a passive role; rather, it has a creative power (such as the Divine creative power) that can create forms. These forms subsist on the soul, as the essence of God creates the world, and the world subsists on Him (*Ibid*).

6.12 Natural Death

According to substantial motion, the soul intensifies in its essence and entity and moves from one state to another one. The more the soul intensifies existentially the less it pays attention to the body; subsequently the body and its faculties weaken, and then the soul reaches a stage of substantial perfection and existential independence that eventually its relation to the body discontinues, and natural death occurs. Therefore, the extinction of body's power and its faculties does not cause natural death; otherwise the soul must follow the body, and the body also should part with the soul, and not vice versa; whereas it is the body that follows the soul, and the separation between the two is caused by the soul's existential intensification and perfection and its independence (Mulla Sadra, 1410, 9, 51).

6.13 The Refutation of Transmigration

One of the conclusions that Mulla Sadra has taken from the theory of corporeal origin of the soul, which in turn is based on the substantial motion, is the refutation of transmigration. According to

substantial motion, the human soul turns its potentiality into actuality gradually. When the soul, either traverses the way of felicity or the path of wickedness, reaches its actuality, it will be impossible for it to come back again to the stage of potentiality and relate to another body, as it is impossible for an animal after being an animal to come back to the stage of being an embryo (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 9, 2- 3). Therefore, it is impossible for any soul, after its death, to come back and relate to another body, for each body in its substantial motion has its own special soul and acts according to its natural and essential relation to soul. This soul, which has been pure potentiality at first, develops and actualizes gradually. Now, how is it possible for it to relate to an unfamiliar body that is not proportionate to it? On the other hand, how can the body, in its turn, accept a soul formed and completely proportional to another body? (Mulla Sadra, 1410, 9, 7; 1360, 228-230)

6.14 Proving the Resurrection of the Body

Mulla Sadra claims that his theory of substantial motion proves corporeal resurrection. Of course, he accepts that the theory does not show all details related to the resurrection of the body as stated in Islamic sources. But resurrection and its being corporeal are easily explained by his interpretation. According to substantial motion, the whole material world is moving in its substance. Like every motion, this moving unit necessarily has an end, and, once the unit reaches that end, it becomes complete actuality and ceases to move. Of course, this end is not something external to the world; rather, it is the superior reality of the world. In this journey the origin, destination, and moving thing are one. The moving thing starts from its low reality, and by passing different stages and levels it finally reaches its high reality. Then its motion stops, and another stage, i.e., the Resurrection Day, begins (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 9, 279).

From this, Mulla Sadra concludes that the great event of resurrection is not restricted to the earth and humans; rather it is a cosmic occurrence, a very great event that comprises the entire world and ends with a new cosmos.

From Mulla Sadra's point of view, the soul is an independent substance that traverses different stages in the material world and after

that is freed from matter and potentiality completely, becoming eternal in the world of immaterial intellects. Among the soul's faculties, intellection and imagination are essential to it, while the soul uses animal and vegetative faculties by means of the body. In his view, in consequence of the motion in substance and substantial perfection of man the soul in a level of perfection frees itself from this worldly body and is united with a body from the imaginal world (or the world of Archetypal Images which he calls *alam al-mithal*) or the Isthmus World (*barzakh*) (Mulla Sadra: 1410, 9, 159).

In the Day of Resurrection, all souls, due to their substantial motion, reach a stage of perfection that can create external imaginal forms and accordingly create their own parts of imaginal bodies, in a way that the resurrection of the soul will really be accompanied with the resurrection of the body.

7. Conclusion

The theory of substantial motion, in fact, has exerted a strong influence on Islamic philosophy. Earlier philosophers, before Mulla Sadra, argued that motion occurs only in four accidental categories: quality, quantity, place, and position. They considered the issue as one of the discussions of natural philosophy, i.e., in the realm of changeable and moving issues of the sense, rather than in divine philosophy or metaphysics. Mulla Sadra moves the discussion to the realm of the first philosophy and on the basis of the theory of substantial motion solves many philosophical problems, so that philosophers after him have accepted his solutions. The theory gives us another picture of issues such as the material world and its beyond, presence of God, human rational soul, temporal origination of the world or its pre-eternity, creation and its dependence upon God, and the resurrection of existents and renewing life of humans. These questions have been scattered before the advent of substantial motion, but in the light of this theory, they have been grouped under one heading.

According to this theory, each material existent obtains a new form in every instant that is different from the previous one, due to its essential or substantial change. Propounding the theory in Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra has originated a fundamental turning point in

metaphysical realms such as theology, cosmology, and traditional psychology. This must be classified along with his other theories, such as the fundamentality of existence and its gradation that constitute the principles of Mulla Sadra's philosophical system. By accepting it, one can have a different view of philosophical problems, and even the features of the world and human appear for him in a completely new manifestation and splendor. We have already seen the occurrence of motion only in accidents and the outward aspects of things; now we can see it occurring in substances and essences of all parts of the world. Rather, the world is seen as nothing but a part of motion completely related to its Creator, God. The dependency of the whole world on its agent or the motion-creator can be seen in every instant. Existence and motion in everything of the material world require an immaterial cause to originate them continually and unceasingly. The motion also necessitates the material world to have an end and destination beyond itself; that is, it will reach a stage that is the same as perfection and immateriality.

Previously, one would consider time as independent from the world and the whole world engulfed by it. Yet now, by accepting this theory, one abstracts time from substantial motion of the material world and regards the priority and posteriority of the parts of time as resulted from the priority and posteriority of the parts of this motion.

The problem of the relation between soul and body is also solved; the body with its motion and continual origination and extinction acquires a more complete form every instant until it reaches the stage of immateriality and is endowed with spiritual existence to be one of the immaterial spiritual beings.

According to Mulla Sadra and his followers substantial motion produces an extensive worldview. It brings a unity and coherence between nature and the supernatural realm. Now, after four centuries of philosophical thoughts and scientific research, is this theory still defensible? Are Mulla Sadra's commentaries and interpretations still satisfactory in the light of new Qur'anic research? Is his reasoning still considered to be based on true arguments? These are the questions that must be answered in another article.

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The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications

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Abstract

In this paper, I shall try to clarify the saying/showing distinction and to emphasize the role of this distinction in constructing a coherent picture of language and the world. In order to properly understand the differences between the sayable and the showable, I will throw light on the limits of language and the world. I will explain why it is impossible to say the showable and why it leads to non-sense. I will elucidate the relation between mysticism and the saying/showing distinction and show that both of them are better understood in light of Wittgenstein's solipsism. I will explain how Wittgenstein's transcendental solipsism is different from classical solipsism and how the former leads to pure realism. At several points, I will use the Kantian framework to explain Wittgenstein's view, especially when justifying Wittgenstein's realism.

In reply to Russell's comments on the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein wrote:

"Now I am afraid you haven't really got hold of my main contention, to which the whole business of logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (*gesagt*) by proposition _ i.e. by language (and , what comes to the same , what can be *thought*) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but only shown (*gezeigt*) ;which , I believe , is the cardinal problem of philosophy...."

Again in a letter to Von Ficker, he said that the *Tractatus* consists of two parts:

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"of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written .And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within ... by my book and I'm convinced that, strictly speaking, it can only be delimited in this way." (FL 10/11.19)

In fact, the distinction between what can be said by meaningful propositions and what can only be shown by them is the focal point of philosophy.

We can say that the two letters clarify the structure of the *Tractatus*'s project. The *Tractatus* consists of two parts: a logical one (atomistic ontology, picture theory, tautologies, mathematics, sciences) and a mystical one (solipsism, ethics and aesthetics).

What is it for a proposition to be meaningful? And what is it for a meaningful proposition to be true?

According to Wittgenstein of *Tractatus*, *our* mind is the mirror of our world. The limits of our mind are the limits of our world. The world is the totality of facts, not of things. The world is every thing that is the case. The case is the state of affairs that obtain.

There are two kinds of proposition: compound or molecular propositions and simple or atomic propositions. A compound proposition is made up of a number of simple propositions. And a simple proposition is made up of a number of signs that have a one-to-one correspondence to things in a state of affair. The meaningfulness of propositions is based on this correspondence.

We know *a priori* that there is *isomorphism* between the state of affairs in reality and thoughts in the mind. For a simple proposition to be meaningful it must have *isomorphism* with reality; and for it to be true its corresponding state of affair must be a fact. A proposition is meaningful only when its negation is possible, too.

Only propositions that state the states of affairs satisfy this necessary condition and thus only they are meaningful. In contrast, propositions that try to state the preconditions of language do not satisfy it and thus are not meaningful either.

As for truth, to compare a proposition with reality, we need *a posteriori* testing. That is, no picture is *a priori* true. The focus of direct comparison with reality lies in the facts which we are acquainted with.

How could we discover what showable facts obtain and what

showable facts do not obtain? That is, how could we discover that a proposition trying to say a showable fact, if *per impossible* it could be said, is true? In other words, what is the criterion of these propositions' truth, assuming that they have truth value?

Facts make up the content of the world, and their corresponding sentences make up the content of the language. We can state and have knowledge of things that change in the world. We stay at *the higher level* and make factual statements about things at the *lower level*. We, as a *nomena* self, with our features and limits, think about states of affairs and use our thoughts for expressing meaningful propositions.

We state propositions about *conditioned facts*, although we have preconditions in our language and our world. Put differently, we, as a second-order beings, think and say meaningful propositions about first-order facts.

However, it is not possible to express meaningful propositions about preconditions of thought, language, and the world. We are not in a higher position than boundaries of language and the world, from where we can look down at, and contemplate about, them.

We have knowledge of *conditioned facts* in virtue of their *conditions*, but it is not possible for us to have knowledge of the *conditions* themselves.

To state and know propositions about preconditions of language and knowledge is to fall into a vicious *circle*. In addition, we do not have such a *transcendental faculty* that can have data and knowledge about the *transcendental things* themselves. We can only identify and clarify the limits of language and the world from within. It is to say that there are things in the world which, although unsayable, can be shown or displayed. And this is the very main point of the *tractatus* on which Wittgenstein stressed in the final passage when he said: "We must remain silent about whatever which can not be said." They can only be shown or exhibited in the propositions that say the various things that can be said.

The sentences of the *Tractatus* (which try to say things that are *shewn*) would be helpful, in spite of their being strictly *nonsensical*. After using them as step "to climb out beyond them" and "to see the world rightly"; we must throw them away.

It is worth noting that we must distinguish between logical truths and thing that are *shewn*. Logical truths are tautologies and are *sense-*

less propositions. But attempting to say what can only be *shewn* produces *non-sensical* formations of words. Tautologies or *sense-less* propositions show the "logic of the world", although what they show is not what they attempt to say. In fact, every proposition shows the logic of the world.

At several points in his *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein remarks different kinds of showable and ineffable things: the pictorial form common to picture and what is depicted (TLP 2.172, 2.174), the meanings of signs and that two signs have the same meaning (TLP 3.33ff., 6.23), that a given symbol signifies an object or a number (TLP 4.126), the sense of a proposition (TLP 4.022, see 2.221, 4.461), the logic of facts (TLP 4.0312), the logical multiplicity or form of a proposition and of reality (TLP 4.041, 4.12f.), that a proposition is about a certain object (TLP 4.1211, 5.535), that something falls under a formal concept (TLP 4.126), that logical propositions are tautologies and do not refer to logical constants (TLP 4.0621, 4.461), that one proposition follows from another (TLP 5.12, 5.132, 6.1221), the limits or scaffolding of language and the world (TLP 5.5561, 5.6f., 6.124), that there is no soul (TLP 5.5421), the truth in solipsism-that the "world is my world" (TLP 5.62), that there are laws of nature (TLP 6.36), the ethical and every thing that is "higher" (TLP 6.42f), the meaning of life – the mystical (TLP 6.52ff), the pronouncements of the *Tractatus* itself (TLP 6.54).

We can classify them as follows:

- The logical forms common to propositions and what they depict (inexpressibility of the harmony between thought and reality)
- The meaningfulness of signs and the senses of propositions (prohibition of semantics)
- The logical relations between propositions (no rules of logical inference)
- The logico-syntactical category of signs (formal concepts are pseudo-concepts)
- The structure of thought and world (limits to thought are set from within)
- The mystical (the ineffability of value).

The underlying idea of all above is that the preconditions of symbolic representation can not themselves be represented (NM 108-

9).

Propositions that try to state the essential features of symbolic representation fall into two problems:

Such a proposition itself must be in accordance with the laws of logic and representation. So those logical properties that it tries to state must have been understood before. Otherwise, this proposition does not conform to logic and so can not be a meaningful proposition. (TLP, 3.031 , 4.12 , 5.4731)

Such a proposition tries to say an important point: the limit and structure of thought and the world. It refers not to a possible state of affair, but to something which is the bound of sense. But attempting to clarify the bounds to exclude the "nonsense" itself results in *nonsense*.

What is the relation between the saying/showing distinction and *mysticism*? In his life, Wittgenstein was attracted by Kierkegaard and Tolstoy. It was important for him that religious faith must influence all aspects of human life. So, religious belief, in his view, is not a belief among others, and God is not merely an object like other objects in which we believe. We should not treat religious belief on a par with scientific belief and try to prove it; rather we must treat religious belief as something transcendent, something which must be accepted as a whole and which completely pervades us.

Mystical themes are not the essential core of the *Tractatus*; rather, Wittgenstein presupposed them for providing his philosophy with epistemic coherence.

The saying/showing distinction was used primarily for showing the logical properties of language. But it finally provided the criterion for distinguishing the empirical propositions from higher realms of value - such as ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Mysticism is the archetype of these higher realms of value.

There are differences between logic and mysticism. Logical properties can be shown by empirical propositions. But what shows the mystical? It is not propositions that show ethical values, but it is people's actions and attitudes that show them.

In the *Tractatus* and the *Notebooks*, these items are introduced as mystical:

"The problem of life", which remains untouched even if all scientific problems have been solved (TLP 6.43ff. 6.52f.)
a "contemplation" or "feeling" of the world *sub specie aeternitate* ,

that is , from outside , as a "limited whole" (NB 7.10.16 ; TLP 6.45)

the claim that ethics and aesthetics are based on accepting the world (NB 20.10.16 ; TLP 6.42-6.43)

The idea that death is unreal (TLP 6.43ff.)

It seems that the *tractatus* identifies God with the "general propositional form". Wittgenstein characterized both as "how things stand" (NB 1.8.16; TLP 4.5, 5.471f.) and this is the very possible link between the logical and mystical theories.

The *tractatus* describes the mystical through three features:

It is the paradigm of what is "inexpressible" and shows itself,

It is the content of an attitude , "experience" or feeling,

It is the existence of the world. (Clock, H.J., "Mysticism", in *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, P.252, Blackwell, 1996)

It can be said that both Wittgenstein's mysticism and his saying/showing distinction are based on his transcendental solipsism.

The core idea of solipsism is that the limits of my language mean the limits of my world, so the world is my world. (TLP 5.62, 5.6; NB 23.5.15)

Thus, there are limits to language and the world and life. And we can state only the facts which are within these limits. The facts beyond these limits can only be shown.

According to Russell's principle of acquaintance, followed by Wittgenstein, meaningfulness is derived from individual's immediate present experience. This leads to semantic solipsism. However, Wittgenstein repudiated skepticism by using the transcendental approach. He developed this approach in Kantian terms. Kant believed that the Cartesian's dualism is a sort of idealism. He proclaimed that Descartes is an empirical idealist and a transcendental realist. Contrary to Descartes, Kant is an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist.

Kant regarded the transcendental subject as the transcendental unity of apperception. He overcame skepticism and individualism by virtue of transcendentalism. According to Kant, the transcendental ego encompasses other minds. So, he believed, the problems of skepticism and individualism disappear. The same is true about Wittgenstein's view: in Wittgenstein's approach, transcendental solipsism encompasses other minds and accommodates individual's solipsism. It does not deny the empirical realm; but rather, empirical realm and empirical propositions themselves manifest transcendental solipsism

and we find out solipsism through them. And these propositions have meaning in virtue of showing solipsism. They say and state the empirical content and stimulatingly show transcendental solipsism. Empirical content is possible only when solipsism underlies it. We can put the matter by asking a transcendental question: When is the empirical proposition possible? In other words, when can a proposition say and convey an empirical content? An empirical proposition is possible, only if *transcendental solipsism* is presupposed. Transcendental solipsism is a transcendental condition for every empirical knowledge. At the empirical level, there is no solipsism. So, the individual and classical solipsisms are rejected. But at the transcendental level, every empirical proposition falls under transcendental solipsism. Thus, in order to be able to take a *realistic view* about empirical proposition, we must have assumed transcendental solipsism. Put differently, transcendental solipsism is a necessary condition of the possibility of the realistic view about propositions. Although the empirical fact is said at the same time that transcendental solipsism is shown, the latter has logical priority to the former.

Kant believed that the "I think" is a prefix which comes before every judgments. He supposed that this element guarantees the coherence of the system of beliefs and knowledge. Schopenhauer elaborated this notion and proclaimed that the subject of knowledge is merely an indivisible point. It is the center of all existence and determines the limits of the world. The world is my representation and the idea of a world without a representing subject is a contradiction in terms. Schopenhauer replaced Kant's transcendental unity of apperception with the *superindividual cosmic will*. It underlies the world as representation. (Clock, H.J., "Solipsism", in *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, P.348, Blackwell, 1996)

Instead of accepting the Cartesian soul, Wittgenstein (like Kant) introduces the metaphysical subject which is the limit of the world. The metaphysical subject is not a possible object that can be seen. Rather, it is the eye itself. It is an indivisible point. Wittgenstein called it the "geometrical eye" and "the extentionless point" (NB 11.6/ 4.8/ 12.8/ 2.9/ 12.10.16; TLP 5.63, 5.633-5.64; BB 63-5)

Like Kant, Wittgenstein accepted transcendental idealism. He believed that there are no other minds or other things of which we can

have knowledge. There exists only the self and its immediate experiences. We make judgments about other minds and other things only through our immediate experiences. This approach (namely Wittgenstein's solipsism) is different from skepticism. Skepticism suspends knowledge of other things and minds, but it does not necessarily deny their existence. It admits the possibility of their existence, while rejecting knowledge of it. In contrast, solipsism denies their existence altogether.

Both the solipsist and the skeptic believe that we can not have knowledge of other minds, but their reasons are different: the solipsist denies our knowledge of other minds, because he believes there is no other minds at all; the skeptic denies it because he believes that though there can be other minds, we do not have epistemic access to them. Thus, both the solipsist and the skeptic hold that the conditional "for every x, if x is another mind, then we do not have knowledge of it" is always true. But while the former ascribes its truth to the falsity of the antecedent, the latter ascribes it to the truth of the consequent.

How does Wittgenstein's solipsism lead to pure realism? And what is special about Wittgenstein's solipsism that makes it different from classical solipsism?

As mentioned earlier, Kant's transcendental idealism is compatible with empirical realism. Kant does accept empirical propositions at the empirical level. In contrast to Hume and Locke, he believes that we have access to primary qualia. Then we bring, according to his transcendental idealism, all empirical knowledge under the ideal forms (i.e. epistemic conditions) at the transcendental level.

Like Kant, Wittgenstein does not deny the empirical realism. The truth of solipsism manifests itself in the very possibility of representation and in the logical form of all empirical propositions. In Wittgenstein, transcendental solipsism leads to pure realism, and transcendental subject (ego) replaces the transcendental unity of apperception. The transcendental ego takes the place of "eye" and can not be part of experience. It does not drop out of the experience but is so much involved in it that it can not be described (PG 156).

The self in Wittgenstein's solipsism is different from the self in traditional solipsism. The self or metaphysical subject in Wittgenstein is impersonal and devoid of any individuality. This is the starting point of his pure realism.

Because representation is a linguistic matter, transcendental solipsism in Wittgenstein takes a linguistic turn. "The *I* is replaced by the sentence, and the relation between the *I* and reality is replaced by the relation between the sentence and reality." (Clock, H.J., "Solipsism", in *A Wittgenstein Dictionary*, P.350, Blackwell, 1996)

Classical solipsism says: "I alone exist". In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein made the two following comments on this:

(i)...what the solipsist means is quite correct, only it can not be said, but makes itself manifest....

(ii) Solipsism when its implications are followed out strictly coincides with pure realism.

The first comment relates to Wittgenstein's opinion that we must speak in a formal mode, not in a material one. The solipsist is guilty of trying to say something that can only be shown, and he must restate his position in the formal mode in order to get rid of absurdity. Wittgenstein wrote in 5.61 of the *Tractatus*:

Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we can not say in logic [i.e. as an *a priori* truth], "The world has this in it, and this, but not that." For that [i.e. saying that such and such does not exist] would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities and this can not be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world....we can not think what we can not think, so what we can not think we can not say either....

So, the solipsist in saying that "I alone exist" or "only my experiences are real" is using the material mode. And in the material mode, such sentences appear to have genuine negation, i.e., it is possible that there is something beyond immediate experience. But this implication is evidently impossible.

The word "I" is not a demonstrative pronoun and is not essential to representation of facts. This is how solipsism coincides with pure realism. But is Wittgenstein's solipsism really different from the classical solipsism?

One might say that Wittgenstein's approach is only a sophisticated version of the classical solipsism. For example, John Canfield remarks that what might be called the thesis of selfless solipsism lies at the heart of the *Tractatus* (Cook, J. W., *Wittgenstein's Metaphysics*, P. 66, Cambridge University, 1994).

However, Wittgenstein himself emphasized that there are differences between his thesis and the classical solipsism. The classical solipsism is a metaphysical view attempting to say something about the essence of the world and so is nonsense. In his lecture of 1932-1933, Wittgenstein said: "The solipsist who says "only my experiences are real" is saying that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are real. This is absurd if taken to be a statement of fact.' (WL 35, p.22) He also pointed out "from the very outset realism, idealism, etc. are names which belong to metaphysics. That is, they indicate that their adherents believe that they can say [as opposed to show] something definite about the essence of the world." (PR, p. 86)

Wittgenstein remarked that since the classical solipsism employs the form of "I alone exist", it can not explain the ordinary sentences such as "I fell on his foot, not mine" and "my sister has blue eyes".

A third difference, he remarked, is that the classical solipsist fails to recognize that such words as "I" and "my" have different grammars when used in speaking of experiences and when used in saying such things as "I alone exist" and "only my experiences are real".

According to his version of solipsism, reality merely consists of phenomenal objects so that material objects and other people can be nothing more than that. It is not possible to transcend immediate experience even in thought. In his 1931-1932 lectures, Wittgenstein states this idea in the material mode: "idealists were right in that we never transcend experience" (WL 32, p. 80). In his later years, he did not abandon this idea, but did reformulate it in the formal mode. Thus in a passage in *Zettel*, he says:

It is only apparently possible "to transcend my possible experience"; even these words only seem to make sense, because they are arranged on the analogy of significant expressions. (Z & 260).

References and Abbreviations

- 1- FL Letters to Ludwig von Ficker, ed. Allan Janik, tr. B. Gillette, in *Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives*, ed. C. G. Luckhardt (Hassocks: Harvard Press, 1979).
- 2- NM "Notes dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway" [1914], in NB 108 19.

- 3- NB *Notebooks* 1914-16 [German-English parallel text], ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, rev. edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).
- 4- PR *Philosophical Remarks*, ed. Rush Rhees, tr. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).
- 5- TLP *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* [German-English parallel text], tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).
- 6- WL32 *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1930-1932*, ed. Desmond Lee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- 7- WL35 *Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935*, ed. Alice Ambrose (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
- 8- Z *Zettel* [1945-8, German-English parallel text], ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967).
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The Doctrine of *Khudi* in Iqbāl's Philosophical Thought

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Abstract

Muhammad Iqbāl of Lahore(1877-1938) is undoubtedly the greatest Muslim poet-thinker of the twentieth century. Iqbāl's philosophical writings and poetical works had a notable impression on the religio-cultural and social revival of the East particularly subcontinent Muslim.

The central theme of Iqbāl's philosophical thought throughout his works, prose and poetry, especially in *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* is '*The Doctrine of Khudi*'.

In his opinion the undeveloped condition and the miserable plight of the Muslim nations were due to lost real identity of *Khudi* and to keep distance from the true spirit of Islam.

Iqbāl's ideal for individual as well as social life is Self-affirmation not Self-negation which was the common teaching of Hindu intellectualism and Sufi pantheism. Hence Iqbāl tried to establish a firm theoretical foundation for his viewpoints, and to discover a proper philosophical terminology for conveying his message to all the humanity. On one hand, the inherent genius ,the religious , mystical attitude, deep familiarity with Islamic culture and science which were his family heritage , and his wide-ranging studies in Eastern and Western philosophy on the other helped him to achieve the goal.

To Iqbāl *Khudi* is a universal and comprehensive reality with different degrees in expression, which moves towards

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perfection. Various factors and principles-which are mostly the same positive and negative religio-moral qualities can strengthen or weaken *Khudi* in human beings till it reaches the highest stage of perfection, that is, Vicegerency of God on earth.

Key words: 1. Iqbāl, .Khudi (Personaliry-Individuality-Egohood), *Khudi's* Strengthening Factors, .*Khudi's* Educational Stages, . Iqbāl's Philosophy, Infinite Ego, .Finite Ego

1. Introduction

1.1. Iqbāl the great poet- philosopher of India was born on November the 9th, 1877 at Sialkot in the Punjab, and died at the peak of his fame and glory on April 21, 1838 in Lahore. (Malik: 1971, p.3 & Masud-al-Hasan :1978, p.1) He as is well known, came from a Kashmiri Brahmin stock. The Brahmins, as devotees to Brahma, (a Hindu deity), were given to learning, knowledge and contemplation, and thus produced generations of talented persons. Iqbāl coming from this stock, inherited a sensitive soul, a penetrating intelligence, rich emotions and a strong will. His ancestors around the two hundred and fifty years before Iqbāl's birth had converted to Islam. As an enlightened family, they not only observed the practices of Islam but also were imbued with its spirit. Iqbāl, therefore, from his very infancy was made conversant with Islam and inherited its best traditions. On the other hand Iqbāl's teachers had a vital role in the progress and maturity of his personality.

Mir Hasan Shah, a Muslim savant and spiritual man, who undertook his education and training at an early age, nurtured him with the spirit of Islamic thought and literature. This tasted received an additional impetus at the hands of Thomas Arnold, a great orientalist. Arnold not only initiated Iqbāl into modern scholarship but also created in him a devotion to scientific knowledge and western thought, in the pursuit of which Iqbāl went to Europe. (khātoon: 1963, p. x iii & Masud-al-Hasan :1978, p.7)

1.2. His visit to the west can be considered as second phase of Iqbāl's life. There, contemplating on modern sciences and philosophy, he did not separate from the stream of oriental consciousness and

wrote his dissertation on 'The Development of Metaphysics in Persia'. He took advantage of his stay in Germany and England and searched thoroughly the libraries of Europe for rare manuscripts on Muslim learning and literature. At the same time, Iqbāl, assimilated to the full the intellectual bias, voluntaristic tendencies, the scientific method and the dynamism of European thought. Eventually he was awarded Ph.D. in philosophy and returned to India in 1908. (Masud-al-Hasan:1978,pp.7-12& Khātoon: 1963, p.xiv & Schimmel: 1963, pp.37-8)

On the other hand, Iqbāl was fully conscious of depressing and pitiable conditions of the East towards the close of the nineteenth century.

The consolidation of British role and the deliberate policy of the British to weaken the Muslim politically, economically and culturally had gradually broken the Muslim spirit. The last attempts of religious reformists and revivalists to reestablish Muslim supremacy and revival the moral and spiritual merits of the followers of Islam had failed. (Khātoon:1963,p.xv)

Iqbāl was deeply pained at the sad plight of the Muslims. He was also conscious of his mission to regenerate his people from whom the foreign rulers had snatched away power and supremacy. From long before he had reflected deeply over the problems of his co-religionists. His deep and wide knowledge of sociology and the history of different cultures convinced him that the main responsibility for oriental decadence lay at the door of those philosophical systems which inculcated self-negation and self-abandonment, i.e. the Vedānta school, the doctrine of unitism or wahdat-al-wujūd in Sufism and Hellenic and neo-Platonic ideas which regarded the world as a mere illusion not worth striving for. (khātoon:1963,p.xv & Kāzmi: 1997, p.30)

These system of thoughts encouraged men to run away from the difficulties of life instead grappling with them, and emphasized the annihilation of the self as means of attaining union with the Ultimate Reality. This absorption and negation of the self led Muslims to adopt an otherworldly outlook and an attitude of renunciation of socio-political life. (kāzmi: 1997,pp.30-1)

Iqbāl was very much dissatisfied with this state of affairs. So he arrived at the solution of the political problems of the East, but a consistent philosophical basis of his message was as yet lacking. He wanted a comprehensive philosophy which should co-ordinate all the

elements of his message and should serve as a vantage ground from which all problems about life could be solved.

1.3.His acquaintance with the thoughts of great western philosophers as well as Muslim mystics works and teachings particularly the famous Persian mystic poet, Jalaluddin Rumi,helped him in developing such a philosophy and discovering a philosophical terminology for conveying his message for the political and spiritual emancipation of all the East, nay, of all the humanity.As a Muslim sage, Iqbāl realized that the revival of man both as an individual and as a member of a social group can only come from the ultimate central principal of his being, namely, the Self or Ego.He, therefore, waged a constant war in his writings against the doctrine of self-negation and strongly criticized such an ideal of human life and as professor R.A. Nicholson has remarked, "developed a philosophy of his own" (Iqbāl:1940, p.vii) based on self-affirmation, under the unique name of *Khudi* .This is the third stage of Iqbāl's development which " may be described as the stage of firm beliefs and well grounded conviction marked by a philosophical depth. In this phase of life, he achieved the maturity of thoughts;his philosophical quest reachhead its goal." (Rafique:1974,P. 37 &khātoon :1963, p.xv)

The present article is comprised of five sections. Besides the Introductory and Conclusion sections, in the other three major parts an attempt has been made , firstly to clarify the nature of *Khudi* through Iqbāl's poetry and prose, secondly to examine the role of the most basic factors which strengthen it, and thirdly to review the evolutionary process of *khudi* through different stages of education towards the highest plane of perfection i.e. Vicegerency of God on earth.

2. The Nature of khudi

2.1. Identification of Khudi

Khudi, in the literary sense of the word means: Individuality or Iness .Iqbāl uses the terms 'Ego' and 'Self' in synonymity with *Khudi*. (Iqbāl:1965,p.98) To him self is also synonymous with 'Soul' which is a matter of common occurrence in Sufi literature.(Ibid: p. 106)

Human self or ego is the dominance of a particular self, subordinating and unifying all the other selves which constitute the mental life of man. Iqbāl in his *Lectures* says: "The ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind." (Ibid:pp.98-9)

It is noticeable that Iqbāl's choice of the word **Khudi** raised a storm of protests. As Schimmel writes it was understandable considering "the highly negative significance in Persian of the word **Khudi**, self, with its implications of selfishness, egotism and similar objectionable meanings". (Schimmel:1963, p.42) Iqbāl was aware of this and admitted that the word **Khudi** was chosen with great difficulty and most reluctantly because from a literary point of view it has many shortcomings and ethically it is generally used in a bad sense both in Urdu and Persian. Iqbāl tells us that he wanted a colorless word for self, having no ethical significance. "As far as I know there is no such word in either Urdu or Persian Considering the requirements of verse, I thought that the word **Khudi** was the most suitable, also because there is ... some evidence in the Persian language of the word **Khudi** in the simple sense of self, i.e. to say the colorless fact of the 'I'. Thus metaphysically the word **Khudi** is used in the sense of that indescribable feeling, I which forms the basis of the uniqueness of each individual." (Vahid:1964, pp. 243-4)

2.2. **Khudi**, An Undeniable Reality

To Iqbāl **Khudi** is a fact and not an illusion. It is neither an abstract thought nor an idea.

"If you say that 'I' is a mere imagination; And its appearance is mere appearance; Then tell me, who is it that entertains these imagination; Just look within and think what this appearance is". (Iqbāl:1964,p.51)

Again, Iqbāl says that inner experience is the self or ego at work. "we appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, Judging, and willing". (Iqbāl: 1965,pl02) To him the main purpose of the Quran is to awaken in man "the higher consciousness of his manifold relations with God and the universe". (Ibid:pp.8-9) And this 'higher consciousness' is not possible without the self. Further, as R.A. Nicholson maintains, the

capacity for action which is vehemently advocated by Iqbāl "depends ultimately on the conviction that **Khudi** is real and is not merely an illusion of the mind. (Iqbāl: 1940,p.xii) In *Jāvid Nāma* Iqbāl gives due importance to self-recognition and asserts that the consciousness can testify your state.

"Life means to adorn oneself in ones self, To desir to bear witness to one's own begin; Whether you be alive , or dead , or dying-For this seek witness from three witnesses. The first witness is self - consciousness, To behold oneself in one's own light; The second witness is the consciousness of another, To behold oneself in another's light; The third witness is the consciousness of God's essence, To behold oneself in the light God's essence^٢ ." (Iqbāl : 1966, pp.29-30)

2.3.Khudi, A Dependent Reality

To Iqbāl also **Khudi** is not an independent reality .God , the infinite Ego ,is the source of life for finite ego which can maintain its existence only as long as it is in contact with this All- Embracing Divine **Khudi**.

"The self has existence from the existence of God, The Self has show from the showing of God, I do not know where this splendid pearl ,Would be , if there be no ocean^٣" (Schimmel: 1963,p.123)

The same idea expressed in the *Lectures*: "Like pearls we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine Life^٤."(Iqbāl :1965,p.72)

This **Khudi** , born in the heart of the Infinite **Khudi** ,developing in him and yet distinct from Him , unable to exist without Him ,but also unable to be non-existent in His Presence.It is like a secret in the breast of the world. (A.schimmel:1963,pp.122-3)

"Our breath is a stray breaker from His sea.His breath makes music in our souls , His flutes.Grown by the stream – brink of Eternity,We draw the sap from it through our grass-roots^٥ ." (Iqbāl:1977 , p.25)

Iqbāl has deeply felt this mutual attraction between God and man , the longing of that loving and living **Khudi** which man calls God , and in many of his poetical prayers he has referred to this highest experience in most beautiful verses:

"A lute , played by you , I make melody. You are my soul and yet

outside my soul . A lamp,I burn with Your flame;else I die .
 How are you,O my Life,outside of me? (Ibid) ,And again : “whom
 do you seek ? why are you so perturbed?For He is manifest and
 you concealed. Seek Him and you will only see your Self Seek
 your Self ; you will find but Him revealed.” (Ibid:pp.25-6)

2.4. *Khudi* , A Universal Reality

Iqbāl believes that *Khudi* is a real and pre-eminently significant entity which is the center and basis of entire organization of life and has various features and stages of development. The achievement of a profounder *Khudi* is not confined to man alone .He says:"Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of egohood until it reaches its perfection in man, that is why Quran declares the Ultimate Ego to be nearer to man than his own neck vein". (Iqbāl: 1965,pp.71-2)

In the first part of his *Asrār* under the title of "showing that the system of the universe originates in the self, and that the continuation of the life of all individuals depends on strengthening the self" (Iqbāl : 1940,p.16), he says:

"The form of existence is an effect of the self, Whatsoever thou seest is a secret of the self.When the self awoke to consciousness, It revealed the univers of thought. A hundred words are hidden in its essence: Self - affirmation brings Not- self to light... . Tis the nature of the self to manifest itself: In every atoms lumbers the might of the Self."(Ibid : p.16-9)

Starting with the individual ego as the center of will and energy , Iqbāl develops his philosophical system- his conception of God, conception of time, individual, freedom, will and immortality.According to him every object possesses an individuality in the scale of life and the status of every object is fixed according to the extent it develops its individuality and gains mastery over the entire environment."(Kāzmi: 1997, p. 13)

"Every thing is preoccupied with self-expression , Every atom a candidate for greatness.Life without this impulse spells death,By the perfection of his individuality man becomes like God.The force of individuality makes the mustard seed into a mounion,Its weakness reduces the mounion into a mustard seed. Thou alone art the Reality in this Universe,All the rest is a mirage^" (Saiyidan: 1988, p.8)

2.5. *Khudi*, the Standard of Valuation

To Iqbāl , the criterion of the degree of reality of any living organism is the extent to which it has achieved the feeling of a distinct ***Khudi***: "Only that truly exist which can say 'I am' . It is the degree of the intuition of I-am-ness that determines the place of a thing in the scale of being". (Iqbāl :1965,p.iii) Thus the idea of ***Khudi*** gives us a standard of value. "It settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good , that which weakens it is bad. Art , religion , and ethics must be judged from the stand- point of personality." (Iqbāl : 1940,pp.xxi-ii)

In his *Asrār*, Iqbāl reverts to this theme again and again, and finds out the true meaning of the evolutionary process in this striving towards the achievement of a fuller and richer ***Khudi***.

"Inasmuch as the life of the universe comes from the power of the self , Life is in proportion to this power. When a drop of water gets of selfless by heart,

It makes its worthless existence a pearl.

Wine is form less because its self is weak;

It receives a form by favour of the cup.

When the mountain loses its self ,it turns into sands,And complains that the sea surges over it. When the grass found a means of growth in its self,Its aspiration clove the breast of the garden .

When life gathers strength from the self,The river of life expands into an ocean⁹". (Iqbāl:1940,pp.20-2)

The reality of the ***khudi*** is denied by pantheists. They regard the physical world as non-existent and unreal. Iqbāl believes that such denial of the ***khudi*** taught by Hindu intellectualism and Islamic pantheism have led Muslims to inaction and destroyed the spirit of creativity in them. He, therefore, "throws himself with all his might against idealistic philosophers and pseudo-mystical poets , the authors , in his opinion, of the decay prevailing in Islam, and urges that only by self-affirmation, self-expression, and self-development can the Moslems once more become strong and free." (Iqbāl:1940, pp.xii-iii)

Explaining his Ideal of self-preservation as against self-negation , Iqbāl , in his *Asrār* narrates the story of a thirsty bird who saw a glistening diamond and thought it to be water . But as he approached it and tried to drink , he found that it was as hard as stone. For ,it had enriched its being and fortified its self .Being disappointed , that bird

proceeded farther and saw a dew-drop. It rushed at it once and drank it up. As the self of the dew-drop was not strong and fortified and it had a very frail being. It was obliterated from the existence easily. (Rafique: 1974, p.145)

Iqbāl draws the following lesson from this story:

"Never for an instant neglect self-reservation, Be a diamond, not a dew-drop. Save thyself by affirmation of self, Compress thy quicksilver into silver one, Produce a melody from the string of self; Make manifest the secrets of self". (Iqbāl: 1940, pp.102-3)

Discussing the declaration of Hallaj *Anal Haq* 'I am the Creative Truth' Iqbāl points out that the true interpretation of human experience "is not the drop slipping into the sea but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying phase of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder personality". (Iqbāl: 1965, p.96)

"It is not the goal of our journey, To merge ourselves in his ocean. If you catch hold of him, it is not *Fanā* (extinction). It is impossible for an ego to be absorbed in another ego. For the ego to be itself is its perfection". (Iqbāl: 1964, pp.32-3)

To Iqbāl *Fanā* 'does not mean annihilation of the *khudī*. A. Schimmel truly depicts the picture of Iqbāl's view of *Fanā*: "The idea of *fanā*, which has been taken in the meaning of obliteration, annihilation of the self is completely unaccepted to Iqbāl Essentially it is the annihilation of human qualities and their substitution by more sublimated, even divine qualities, according to the prophetic tradition, *Takhallaqu bi-Akhlāq-i-Allāh*, 'Create in yourselves the attributes of God'. (Schimmel: 1963, pp.366-7) Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique Individual. (Iqbāl: 1940, p.viii)

In his *Bāl-i-Jibril* Iqbāl says:

"The manifestation of the Egohood spell Prophethood, The solitudes of the Egohood spell Godhood; The earth, the heavens, the Divine seat, Nay, the entire kingdom of God is the grasp of the Egohood". (Kāzmi: 1997, p.32)

He further says: "The end of the egos quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is on the other hand, a more precise definition of it." (Iqbāl: 1920, p.198)

For Iqbāl, the test of egos development is the retention of

individuality . The development reaches its climax when the ego is able to retain full self-possession , even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing ego." (Ibid: p.118)

Iqbāl here gives the example of the holy Prophets' ascension when he viewed the very essence of God and retained his own self. (Ibid)

"That man alone is real who dares- Dares to see God face to face. No one can stand unshaken in His presence; And he who can ,verily ,he is pure gold"¹⁷ " (Ibid:p.198,Iqbāl sown translation from *Jāvid Nāma*)

3.The Growth and Evolution of Khudi

As we discussed in the preceding section, **Khudi** is a universal reality on which the essence of every creature in the whole system of existence depends. Besides all living organisms also are struggling to achieve a more complex and perfect **Khudi**.As Iqbāl opines: "This gradually rising of note of ego-hood, runs throughout the entire gamut of being till it reaches its perfection in man."(Ibid:p.68)

Of all the living creatures, however, man has achieved the highest measure of individuality and is most conscious of his own reality, but he is not yet a complete individual . **Khudi** has the quality of growth as well as the quality of corruption. The greater his distance from God ,the less his individuality. He who comes nearest to God is the completest person. (Iqbāl :1940,p.xix)

"Give not away one particle of the glow you have, Knot tightly together glow within you; Fairer it is to increase one's glow, Fairer it is to test oneself before the sun; Then chisel a new the crumbled form; Make proof of yourself ; be a true being!Only such an existent is praiseworthy, Otherwise the fire of life is mere smoke. . It was by way of birth , excellent man, That you came into this dimensioned world; By birth it is possible also to escape, It is possible to loosen all fetters from ,oneself."¹⁸ (Iqbāl:1966,pp.30-31)

Khudi has capacity to absorb the elements of the universe and the attributes of God . On the other hand , it can also degenerate to the level of matter. Thus it is of the highest importance in the evolution of man to study the factors and forces which strengthen or weaken **Khudi**. In this part of the article , the chief factors which fortify **Khudi** will be examined.

i. Love

Iqbāl lays great emphasis on the value of love for strengthening *Khudi*. To him love for an individual means the assimilation and absorption of the characteristics prominent in the beloved. Although Iqbāl's prose and poetry are imbued of the description of the concept of love, but no words and statements can portrait a proper picture of that as he understood it.

Referring to love he says in a letter to professor Nicholson : " This word is used in a very wide sense and means the desire to assimilate , to absorb. Its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavor to realize them. Love individualizes the lover as well as the beloved. The effort to realize the most unique individuality individualizes the seeker and implies individuality of the sought, for nothing else would satisfy the nature of the seeker." (Iqbāl :1920,p.xviii)

Iqbāl has described the connection between love and *Khudi* in these lines :

" The luminous point whose name is the self, Is the life – spark beneath our dust. By love it is made more lasting, More living , more burning , more glowing. From love proceeds the radiance of its being, And the development of its unknown possibilities. Its nature gathers fire from love, Love instructs it to illumine the world¹⁰". (Ibid, p.28)

In *Bāl-i-Jibril*, visiting the 'Mosque of Cordoba', Iqbāl pays tribute to love in the highest possible terms :

"Love is Gabriel's breath, love is mohamad's strong heart. Love is the envoy of God , love is the utterance of God. Even our mortal clay , touched by love's ecstasy glows; Love is a new-pressed wine , love is the goblet of kings. Love's is the plectrum that draws music from life's taut strings-Love's is the warmth of life , love's is the radiance of life¹¹ .

"(Kiernan:1955, p.38)

Addressing to love as the secret of our heart and as our sowing and harvest, asks it since these earthly spirits have too aged grown , come and bring another *Ādam* out of our clay¹². (Iqbāl:1977,p.28)

The strength and potency of our faith depend on the degree and

depth of love. Love transcends man to the highest plane of the existence which is the Vicegerency of God on earth.

"Be a lover constant in devotion to thy beloved, That thou mayst cast thy noose and capture God. By the might of love evoke an army, Reveal thyself on the farm of love. That the Lord of ka'ba may show thee favour, And make thee the object of the text, Lo, I will appoint a vicegerent on the earth. [Quran.2/28]¹⁴" (Iqbāl:1940,pp.36-7)

For Iqbāl love's alchemy converts mans dross into gold¹⁵. (Iqbāl: 1961, pp:36-7) And , in deed it is something more than elixir since it turns all baser passions into itself. (Iqbāl , Stray Reflection:1961,p.67) Love is associated with kingdom and the lover is who has the double world controlled¹⁶. (Arberry: 1961,p:83)

ii. Desire

Throughout Iqbāl's writings great stress is placed on desire or formation of new purposes and objects as the source from which the self gets nourishment .To him the life of the self depends on creating perpetual desires and ideals. By such a life he means one which knows no rest and show in a ceaseless manner new ideals and desires. It is through desires that our life becomes enthusiastic and dynamic.

"Life is preserved by purpose: Because of the goal its caravan bell tinkles. Life is latent in seeking,Its origin is hidden in desire,Keep desire alive in thy heart,Lest thy little dust become a tomb.Desire is the soul of this world of hue and scent,The nature of every thing is a store- house of desire. .Desire keeps the self in perpetual uproar,It is a restless wave of the self's sea, Tis desire that enricheslife¹⁷." (Iqbāl: 1940, pp.23-7)

Iqbāl calls desire several names such as *suz*, *hasrat*, *Justuju*, *ārzu*, *ishtiyyāq* and *tamannā*.(Ibid) In deed, we live by forming new ideals and glow with the sunbeams of desires¹⁸.(Ibid: p.27)They keep *Khudi* in everlasting pulsation.

"Tis the brand of desire makes the blood of man run warm, By the lamp of desire this dust is enkindled . By desire Life's cup is brimmed with wine , So that Life leaps to its feet and marches briskly on.

Life is occupied with conquest alone, And the one charm for conquest is desire...^{۳۳}."(Ibid :p.60)

In *payām-i-mashriq* , Iqbāl manifest himself as an exhaustible aspirant for beauty, creativity and self-realization inspired by new vision and purposes. (Iqbāl:1977,p.92) Life can be viewed as dynamic only when it is imbued with restless burning^{۳۴}.(Iqbāl :1940,p.24)

Again he asks " what are social organization ,customs , and laws? What is the secret of the novel ties of science? " Then replies: "A desire which realized itself by its own strength and burst forth from the heart and took shape."^{۳۵}" (Ibid:pp.25-6)

Man has the capacity for endless yearning in his eyes. This capacity lifts him to a station where he would not change his position even with God^{۳۶}.

iii. Faqr

Faqr or *isteghnā* and *faqir* or *qalandar* appear very frequently in the later writings of Iqbāl . It plays a vital role in strengthening of *Khudi* . In *Bāl-i-Jibril* he points out to the fact:

When the sword of self is sharpened on the whetstone of *faqr*,The stroke of one soldier does the work of an army.^{۳۷}"

(Saiyidan:1988,p.108)

In common usage today, a beggar is know as a *faqir* but in Iqbāl's thought *faqiri* and beggary are diametrically opposed.A true *faqir* takes no dole even from God. A *faqir* not only does not accept charity, it is against the dignity of his state to complain about the hardness of his lot^{۳۸} .

Iqbāl is fully aware of different interpretations of the term:

"There is a *faqr* which only teaches cunning to the hunter; There is a *faqr* which shows how man can conquer the word; There is a *faqr* which makes nations humbled and depressed ; There is a *faqr* which endows the dust with the attributes of gold"^{۳۹}(Ibid)

So what is the right meaning of *faqr* in his opinion ?

As we have seen before, Iqbāl rejects the attitude of self-negation influenced by pseudo-mysticism, and in contrary, advocates an alive and active presence of man in society which would lead him to conquest of

the material world. But while advocating this, he is anxious that, man should control an inner attitude of detachment and superiority to his material possessions. This is the real sense of *faqr* which can save humanity against becoming a slave to wordly pleasures and temptations. To him *faqir* is not monk or an ascetic who lives a life of abstinence and renunciation , cut off from the rest of mankind.

"The withdrawal from the world of matter is not the end of true renunciation; It means the conquest of the earth and the heavens;I wash my hands of the ascetics *faqr*,Which is not but poverty and grieving. The nation that has lost the wealth of Taimur's courage;Can neither cultivate *faqr* nor win an empire."^{۳۰}

"(Ibid:pp.107-8)

Iqbāl regards the true and positive meaning of *faqr* as *faqr-i-Quran* and identifies it with dominion and kingship. It is the leader of leaders and the king of kings. In his words, crown , throne and army are all the miracles of *faqr*. *Faqr* endows a slave with the qualities of a master , releases him from every thing besides God , and enables him to conquest the mundane world . The spirit of the 'Lion of God' ,*Ali* , a paragon of the perfect *Khudi* is imbued with *faqr*.

iv. Tolerance and Forbearance

Tolerance for other peoples' views and manners represents intellectual breath and spiritual expansion in *khudi* , and its cultivation is beneficial to any human society. It is obvious that if every member of a group is to develop his individuality to the fullest extent, intolerance will only lead to perpetual quarrels and conflicts. Iqbāl remarks: "The principal of the ego-sustaining deed is respect for the ego in myself as well as in others."(Iqbāl :1920,p.119) "Iqbāl's tolerance is born of strength , not of weakness, it is the tolerance of man of strong faith who has fervently cherished convictions his own , but, on that very account, realizes that respect is due to those of others".(Saiyidain: 1988,p.105)

In this sense Iqbāl believes in forbearance and tolerance as the basis of true humanism and genuine religious spirit .To his son he gives this advice :

" Religion is a constant yearning for perfection,It begins in reverence and ends in love ; It is a sin to utter hash words , for the

believer and the unbeliever are alike children of God;What is Adamiyat? Respect for man,learn to appreciate the true worth of man ; The man of love earns the ways of God , and is benevolent alike to the believer and the unbeliever .^{٢١}" (Saiyidian:1988,p.106)

In his *Bāl-i-Jibril*, Iqbāl expresses his respect for truth and love for mankind in a vivid sense:

"The God-intoxicated *Faqir* is neither of the East nor of the West, I belong neither to Delhi nor Isfahan nor Samarkand. I speak out what I consider to be the truth, I am befooled neither by the mosque nor by the modern civilization; Friends and strangers are both displeased with me, For I can not confuse deadly poison with sugar.How can a man who sees and understands truth,Confuse a mound of earth with Mount Damavand."^{٢٢}" (Ibid: .105)

v. Action

Action is, indeed , in Iqbāl's philosophy of *Khudi* the pivot of life.

Khudi achieves its full status and realizes its great destiny through a life of activity and creativity not one of renunciation and imitation.

"Do not content yourself with resting on the shore: The rhythm of life there is slow. Plunge in the sea and grapple with the waves Eternal life consists in struggling so."^{٢٣}" (Iqbāl:1997,p.21)

Iqbāl is an enthusiastic advocate of the importance of activity and creativeness in life. In fact, all our creativeness comes through action and without creativity no progress is possible. Imitation surpasses the creative faculty of life. To imitate is merely to follow the doings of others in a passive way. Both inaction and imitation bring decay into *khudi*. Any relaxation on the part of human personality leads to harmful consequences.

Iqbāl therefore,writes,"personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained. If the state of tension is not maintained, relaxation will ensue."(Iqbāl:1940,p.xxx)Iqbāl's poetry is imbued of this message , expressed beautifully in a hundred different way.

"Sikandar said to khidar aptly : Dive into the stormy sea of life and strive against the waves . Why watch them from the shore ?

Jump in and die and be the more alive"^{٢٤}" (Iqbāl :1977,p,15)

"Do not tell me about that silly moth, Who met an easy , suicidal death. It is the hardly moth that I admire, The one who bravely fights with his last breath"^{٢٥}(Ibid : pp. 13-4)

Using another simile- that of the coal and the diamond-Iqbāl brings out clearly the difference between a raw and mature *Khudi*.

"Because thy being is immature, thou hast become abased; Because thy body is soft , thou art burnt. Be void of fear , grief and anxiety; Be hard as a stone , be a diamond. Whoever strives hard and holds tight; The two worlds are illumined by him. In firmness consists the glory of life; Weakness is worthlessness and immaturity"^{٢٦}. (Iqbāl: 1940,pp.106-7)

Iqbāl uses the term *Suāl* i.e. 'asking' in the sense of inaction , dependence on others, the slavish imitation of their ideas and culture. He says: "As love fortifies the ego asking-suāl weakens it. All that is achieved without personal effort comes under *Suāl* . The son of a rich man who inherits his father's wealth is an 'asker'; so is every one who thinks the thoughts of other." (Iqbāl: 1940,p.xxvi)

Iqbāl's poetry gives this message that , unless individuals as well as the community develop self-reliance and evolve the inner richness of their own being , their potentialities will remain wrapped and repressed , in a variety of beautiful forms.

"Asking disintegrates the Self, And deprives of illumination the Sinai-bush of the Self. By asking poverty is made more abject; By begging the beggar is made poorer."^{٢٧} (Iqbāl: 1940,p.39)

For more information, see *Secrets of the Self*, under the title of: Showing that the self is weakened by asking (pp.38-42)

In his *Payām-i-Mashriq*:

"How long this moth-like fluttering , O heart ? Why do you not adopt a manlier part? Burn yourself at your own flame for a while : Why round an alien flame thus dance and dart ?"^{٢٨} (Iqbāl : 1977, p.10)

And again :

"One morning in a garden , passing by, I heard a bird perched on a high branch cry; Out with whatever you have inside you-A song, a plaint, a dirge, a cry, a sigh."^{٢٩} (Ibid :p. 13)

vi. Courage

Iqbāl believes that the cultivation of an attitude of courage is essential for the proper education of character. Just as creativity and originality strengthen the *khudi*, release its potential capacity for great needs, fear, which is the negation of them, weakens it and becomes the source of all kinds of corruption in the individual character.

"Grief, like a lancet, pierces the soul's vein... Fear, save of God, is the dire enemy of works, The high way man that plundereth life's caravan. Purpose most resolute, when fear attends, thinks upon. What may be, and lofty zeal to circumspection yields. Or let its seed be sown within thy soil, Life remains stunted of its full display. Whatever evil lurks within thy heart, Thou canst be certain that its origin Is fear: fraud, cunning, malice, lies—all these flourish on terror."^{٤١}

(Iqbāl: 1953, pp. 14-6)

The impact of courage on developing of *Khudi* in Iqbāl's thought is so high that he identifies the fear with the veiled idolatory-shirk-i-khafi- and as Saiyidain remarks:

"Courage can be cultivated as an attribute of character by making Tawhid an active working principle of conduct. This, according to Iqbāl, implies a rejection of all fears except the fear of God... and an attitude to manly defiance towards all other powers which may threaten to arrest our legitimate human rights." (Saiyadian: 1988, p. 99)

"The fear of God faiths only preface is, All other fear is secret disbelief"^{٤٢} (Ibid, p. 18)

"who understands the Perophets clue aright, Sees infidelity concealed in fear."^{٤٣} (Ibid, p. 16)

vii. Suffering

Suffering is included in the concept of *faqr* and is associated very closely with action, and struggle. Iqbāl observes that "no religious system can ignore the moral value of suffering" (Iqbāl: 1961, p. 115) ... "Suffering is a gift from the gods in order to make man see the whole life." (Ibid, p. 103)

As we saw before, to live, in Iqbāl's view, means to live in danger, and he considers active life and strife as two of the elements which

strengthen *Khudi* and help it to unfold its possibilities. So "evil and suffering are only a whetstone of man who struggles with them, conquers them and makes them eventually obedient servants to his will, embodying their powers into his own self." (Schimmel : 1963,p142)

"The Self becomes more mature though suffering, Until the Self rends the veils that cover God. The God-seeing man sees himself only through God; Crying 'one God', he quivers in his own blood. To quiver in blood is a great honour for love, Saw , stave and halter- these are love's festival. Upon the road of love , whatever betides is good; Then welcome to the unloving kindnesses of the Beloved. ^{۱۳}"(Iqbāl: 1966,p.49)

As Schimmel writes: Iqbāl's idea that the more developed the ego is , the better it can stand the heaviest shocks without being destroyed , and can even survive the shock of corporeal death , may be is taken from popular piety , namely , that God showers down afflictions on those whom he prefers. (Schimmel:1963,pp.142-3)

In this regard Iqbāl "has often reminded his readers of the old symbol which had been frequently used by Rumi: to cast oneself upon the fire like rue:rue and aloe-wood exhale sweet perfumes when burnt- thus man , in the fire of trials and sufferings can prove that he is more than an ordinary log and show unexpected spiritual riches." (Ibid, p. 142)

In *Bāng-i-Darā* ,again Iqbāl refers to the vital role of grief and suffering for the maturity of *Khudi* and consider them as the lamp of the heart; an adornment of the spirit's mirror;and a silent song of the spirit which is entwined with the melody of the lute of life.^{۱۴} (Iqbāl : 1990,pp. 168-9)

It will be noticed that many of the factors mentioned represent the positive and negative of the same pictures. For example , if a man acts with courage he is discarding fear, a man who lives an active efforts and creativity disdains any form of imitation and comfort. It is very difficult to keep the benign and malign factors influencing the development of *khudi* in water tight compartments. All these forces act and react and tend to mix together along the boundary . Here just the most important of them have been detailed separately for the sake of elucidation and right emphasis.

4)The Stages of the Education of Khudi :

By encouraging influences which fortify *Khudi*, and by avoiding those which lead to its weakening, *khudi* grows from strength to strength till it reaches the highest stage of perfection. In this evolutionary process it has to pass through three stages.

- i) Obedience to Law . -*Eta 'at-*
- ii) Self-Control -*Dabt-i-Nafs-*,
- iii) Divine Vicegerency-Niyābat-i-Ēlāhi-

i.Obedience to Law

Obedience to law and self-control also play a great part in the fortification of *khudi*,but Iqbāl prefers to regard them as representing milestones on the upward march towards the goal -*Nāab-* . To a *khudi* that is properly disciplined and suitably fortified , the first stage is represented by a phase where obedience to the law comes unconsciously. *Khudi* has no conflicts to face so far as the law is concerned.

Iqbāl likens the state of *khudi* in the first stage to a camel that its ways are patience and perseverance and its traits are service and toil. He eats seldom sleeps little and noiselessly steps along the staid track till reaches his rider to the journey's end .(Iqbāl ,1940,pp.72-4) Then while hinting to this verse of Holy Quran:"Those who believe and do righteous deeds: there is blessedness and a fair resort".¹⁰ (Arberry(tr) :1955,13/28) he says:

"Thou,too,do not refuse the burden of Duty.So will thou enjoy the best dwelling -place which is with God.Endeavour to obey.O needless one!Liberty is the fruit of compulsion.By obedience the man of no worth is made worthy,By disobedience his fire turned to ashes.Who would master the sun and stars,Let him make himself a prisoner of Law!Do not complain of the hardness of the law.Do not transgress the statutes of Muhammad!"¹¹(Iqbāl :1940,pp.73-)

ii. Self-Control

On the other hand obedience to Law, along with other benign forces, tends to school *khudi* for the second evolutionary phase where it attains perfect self-control. Self-control in its turn prepares *khudi* for the final stage i.e. Divine Vicegerency.

In this stage one has to govern himself by himself, the nobler part of nature. He that does not command himself becomes a receiver of commands from others. The individual should fear no one but God. He should also not have attachment with worldly things.

"Thy soul cares only for itself, like the camel: It is self-conceited, self-governed, and self-willed. Be a man, get its halter into thine hand, that thou mayst become a pearl albeit thou art a potter's vessel. He that does not command himself, become a receiver of commands from others. Draw might from the litany "O Almighty one!" that thou mayst ride the camel of thy body^{٤٨}. (Ibid:pp.75-8)

iii. Divine Vicegerency

Divine Vicegerency is the third and highest stage in the development of *khudi*. According to him, the purpose of God in creating man was to place His own vicegerency or representative upon earth. Every man is potentially the vicegerent of God, but he has to realize this status manifestly. Iqbal believes that one who can rule his body, can also rule the whole world. "He is the complete Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body." (Iqbal:1940,p.xxvii) Iqbal further tells that the *nā'ib* is the synthesis of power and knowledge, thought and action, instinct and reason. "He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end." (Ibid:p.xxiii) His kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth.

In his *Asrār* he describes him in the following lines:

"Tis sweet to be God's vicegerent in the world, And exercise sway over the elements. God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe. His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name. He knows the mysteries of part and whole, He executes the command of Allah in the world...He is the final cause of " God taught Adam the names of

all things" He is the inmost sense of "Glory to Him that ransported His servant by night".pppear, O rider of Destiny! Appear, O light of the dark realm of change. Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest, Thou art the goal of life's caravan.^{٤٩}" (Iqbāl: 1920, pp.79-84)

Whilst rules and stages of development of *khudi* are laid down above, *khudi* can develop fully only in association with other *khudi* and not in isolation.

The vicegerent has to work in cooperation with others to bring about the kingdom of God on earth. And he can not exist independently of the group to which he belongs:

"The link that binds the individual To the Society a Mercy is: His truest Self in the community, Alone achieves fulfillment. Wherefore be so far as in thee lies in close report, With thy society and luster bring. To the wide intercourse of free-born men. He wins respect as being one of them. And the society is recognized. As by comprising many such as he. When in the congregation he is lost. Tis like a drop which, seeking to expand, becomes an ocean. Self negates itself in the community, that it may be no more a petal, but a rosary".^{٥٠}

(Iqbāl: 1955, pp.5-7)

In deed Iqbāl's philosophy of *khudi* is thought valid also for the whole community of faithful, since according to him a nation is, just as the individual an *khudi*, and has to follow the same lines of conduct as the individual does. Iqbāl, therefore, applies the same factors and forces which are required for the growth and strength of *khudi* i.e. love, desire, effort, etc. not only to the individual but as well to the nation. (Iqbāl: 1376 A.H, pp. 98-100)

In the *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* where he develops in full his ideas on nationhood he compares the national *khudi* to that of a child which develops slowly until it can say 'I'.

" His eye prehensile lights upon himself, His little hand clutched to his breast, he cries 'I!'. This newborn 'I' the inception is of life. This the true song of life's awaking lute."^{٥١} Iqbāl: 1955, p.60) (For more details

see: *Rumuz* under the title of "That the perfection of communal life is attained when the community, like the individual, discovers the sensation of Self...." (Ibid: p.59)

5) Summing-up and Conclusion

Considering the age that Iqbāl appeared on the scene of thought and

culture in India, we saw that the East was in such a depressing and pitiable situation which could not but set a heart sore observer like Iqbāl thinking. The last attempts of religious reformists and thinkers such as Syed Ahmad Shahid, Syed Ahmad Khan, Hāli , and others to re-establish Muslim supremacy and lost glories and revival the moral and spiritual decline of the followers of Islam had failed.

Iqbāl , therefore ,was fully aware of his mission at the sad plight of Muslims and reflected deeply over the problems of his co-religionists during his stay in Europe and also after his return to India.

On one hand early influences of Iqbāl's immediate environment i.e.his parents and teachers who were of religious and mystical attitude, great learning and noble character , and his acquaintance with works of great western philosophers especially Bergson and Nietzsche as well as with thoughts and teachings of eminent Muslim thinkers and mystics particularly Rumi, played a vital role in

tracing the inner development of Iqbāl and greatly contributed to him in fulfillment of his mission i.e. the regeneration of his nation.

As a Muslim sage he realized that the revival of man both as an individual and as a member of social group can only come from the ultimate central principle of his being, namely ,the Self or *Khudi*.

His deep and wide knowledge convinced him that the decadent condition of Muslims was due to those philosophical systems which regard the world as a mere illusion not worth striving for, and to certain classes of Sufis who regarded self-annihilation as the highest goal of human life.

Iqbāl ,therefore,condemned the doctrine of dissolution of the human self into the featureless Absolute as an Ideal of inaction and poverty of life, and developed his own doctrine based on self-affirmation under the unique name of *Khudi*.

According to him:

1) *Khudi* is a reality neither an abstract thought nor an idea that reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states does not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another. They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind.

To Iqbāl , inner experience is the ego or *Khudi* at work. In deed our appreciation of the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging and willing depends ultimately on the conviction that *Khudi* is real and is

not merely an illusion of the mind.

2) **Khudi** is a universal and multi-degree reality. There is a gradually rising note of egohood in the whole universe which differs in degree among the creatures. We are conscious of this in our own self, in nature before us and in the ultimate principle, of all life, the Ultimate Ego.

3) **Khudi** is the gauge of the degree of reality of any living organism. In the scale of life the status of every object is fixed according to extent it develops its

Khudi and gains mastery over the environment. **Khudi** attains highest development in man and here it becomes Personality.

4) **Khudi** is not an independent reality. God the Infinite **Khudi**, is the Source of life for the finite **Khudi** which can maintain its existence only as long as it is in contact with this All-embracing Divine **Khudi**. This **Khudi**, born in the heart of the Infinite **Khudi** developing in Him, and yet distinct from Him, unable to exist without Him, but also unable to be non-existent in His presence.

5) **Khudi** in human beings is individual and uniqueness. Iqbāl says that our pleasures, pains, desires and experiences related to different things and persons which are exclusively ours, forming a part and parcel of our private **Khudi** alone. It is this unique interrelation of our mutual states that we express by the word 'I'.

6) **Khudi** is not a datum; it is an achievement. **Khudi** has the quality of growth as well as the quality of corruption. To Iqbāl if **Khudi** does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter. The greater man's distance from God, the less his individuality.

7) The highest stage of development of **Khudi** is not self-negation-*Fanā*- but self-affirmation-*Baqā*-. The fully developed **Khudi** does not dissolve even when the Reality is seen face to face as in mystic experience. He who comes nearest to God is the complete person. Nor that he is finally absorbed in God. *Fand* to Iqbāl is not in the meaning of annihilation of **Khudi** but according to the Prophetic tradition, *Takhallaqu bi-Akhlāq-i-Allāh*, it is essentially the annihilation of human attributes and their substitution by Divine ones. Thus man becomes unique by becoming more and more like the most unique Individuality.

8) The basis of Iqbāl's doctrine of *khudi* is a strong faith in the evolution of man .To Iqbāl this evolution is to be attained by fortifying *Khudi*. The most

important factors which strengthen *Khudi* are: *Love ,desire ,Action ,Faqr,Courage, Suffering, Tolerance and Forbearance*. *Khudi* in this evolutionary process towards uniqueness has to pass through three stages; Obedience to Law, Self-Control and Divine-Vicegerency.

9) By the side of factors and rules which strengthen *Khudi* , the fully grown *Khudi* will not be attained unless it associates with other *Khudis* in the community to which it belongs. So the kind of society in which the greatest scope for the free development of *Khudi* is provided is of the great importance. According to Iqbāl's philosophy of *Khudi* , a nation is ,just as the individual ,a *Khudi* ,and has to follow the same lines of conduct as the individual does. Hence the same rules and elements required to flourish the individual *Khudi* are applied to the community as the national *Khudi* as well.

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Trinity or Monotheism A Mystical-Qur'anic Approach

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Abstract

The most significant doctrinal difference between Islam and Christianity is the issue of trinity versus monotheism. The doctrine of trinity has a variety of interpretations, the most important of which are Arianism, Sabellianism, Orthodox, Deity, epiphany and the mysterious affair. These interpretations date back to the Old and New Testaments, or rather to religions preceding those scriptures. In all its interpretations, the trinity is strongly refuted by the Qur'an and Islam. On the contrary, Islamic monotheism maintains its identical sense however it may be looked into in the light of different accounts. In what follows, the author has taken a comparative look at the issue of trinity versus monotheism. From one side, he has criticized trinity, and he has clarified the deductive bases of monotheism in the light of theology, mysticism, and the Qur'an, from another side.

Keywords: Trinity, Arianism, Sabellianism, Orthodox, epiphany, unity of Essence, unity of the attributes, and mystical unity.

1. The Analysis of Trinity

There are several issues to be dealt with:

a) Conceptual clarification

Trinity is that we consider God having three Essences, Hypostases, or Persons. Hypostasis comes from the Greek language, meaning "origin" and "foundation," as used in Plotinus' works; however, it takes its root from Syriac.² In Christianity, the term "things" (Pragmata, or in Latin "res") were used for "hypostasis" (in

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2 - Etienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy*, trans. by Shahram Pazuki, p. 53

Greek “ὑπόστασις”), and the term “persons” were used to describe the three Persons of Trinity in order to lay emphasis on their reality. Origen, for example, who used to write in Greek described the “Father” and the “Son” as two things (Pragmata) as regard to their persons, but Tertullian who used to write in Latin argued that a “word” is not something merely composed of “voice or sound of the mouth,” rather it is a “thing (res) and a person.” He has thus described each one of the three Persons as a “thing of existence.”¹

b) Different interpretations of Trinity

Arianism, the first interpretation of trinity, was offered by Arius (AD 250–336), one of the celebrated theologians of the fourth century AD. He believed in monotheism and argued that God did not have a partner; anything outside God or apart from Him comes into existence *ex nihilo*. Jesus, he said, was between God and the world and was a sublime being through whom angels were created.²

Sabellianism was introduced by Sabellius of the third century AD. He believed that God was unique and one both as an Essence and as a hypostasis. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are merely three names for the same and single entity. One hypostasis may assume different names considering various aspects; that hypostasis, with regard to the creation of the world, is the “Father,” with regard to its union with the essence of human nature is the “Son,” and with regard to its mercy to man is the “Holy Spirit.” Trinity, as a result, means three epiphanies rather than three essences. God did manifest Himself as the Father during the Old Testament period, then as the Son, and at last as the Holy Spirit after the rise of Jesus Christ, just as the case of someone who may be called a father, a son, and a brother through different aspects.³

Orthodox is the term used to describe the theory set forth in the Athanasian Creed or the Nicene Creed;⁴ it is agreed upon by the

1 - Harry Austryn Wolfson, the philosophy of the Kalam, P. 126

2 - Mircea Eliade, a selected entries of the Encyclopedia of Religion, trans. by Bahā' al-Din Khurramshāhi as Dinpajuhī, Vol. 2, P. 57

3- Petros Bustani, *the Encyclopedia of Bustani*, Trans. by Robert Aserian, P. 148

4 - Alister E. McGrath, *Christian Theology*, Trans. by Behrooz Haddadi, P. 91

majority of Orthodox Catholic and Protestant Christians. In this strange and unreasonable interpretation, it is frankly stipulated in clear phrasing that Christians worship One God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity, without confusing the three Persons of trinity or separating the essence of each, for the character of the Father is distinct, that of the Son is distinct, and so is the Holy Spirit. The deity, however, of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is unique and one. All three have eternal majesty and magnificence. Whatever the Father is the Son and the Holy Spirit are. All three are not created, but eternal infinite and omnipotent. They insist that although all three are gods, there is only one god. The Father has not come into being from anything else, the Son is born but is not created nor has he come into being. The Holy Spirit, nonetheless, is emanated from the Father and the Son. There is neither priority for these three Persons over one another nor posteriority; none is greater than the other or smaller, but all three are equal and eternal. They hold that they must worship trinity in unity and unity in trinity, which is the only way of salvation.¹

Deity, epiphany, or the mysterious affair, in Christianity, trinity doctrine is prima facie inconsistent with monotheism, thus maintaining both demands for justification. Christians hold that the three Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, share deity which nonetheless is unique and one in its essence. As regard to the compatibility of monotheism with trinity, *the Creeds of the Catholic Church* read:

Trinity is one. We do not confess to three gods, rather to one God in three hypostases: “the trinity which is one in essence” (the Constantinopolitan Creed). Thus, the three hypostases do not share one and single deity, rather each of them is perfectly god: “the Father is the Son, and the Son is the Father, and the Father and the Son are the Holy Spirit; i.e. they are one god in their essence and nature.” (The Council of Toledo)²

One Protestant author says that there are eight points concerning the compatibility of trinity with monotheism buried in this statement: first, that God is One and unique; second, that the Father and the Son

1 - Toni Lynn, *the History of Christian Thought*, Trans. by Robert Aserian, P. 148

2- CCC, P. 60

and the Holy Spirit share deity; third, that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are the three hypostases and Persons each of whom is separate from the other two from everlasting to everlasting; fourth, that these three Persons share the same essence and substance and have equal power and purity; fifth, that each of the three has a particular function, the Father dispatches the Son and the Father and the Son dispatch the Holy Spirit; sixth, that some divine actions may be ascribed to all the three such as creation and maintaining it; seventh, that some divine actions may specifically be ascribed to each of the three (for example, the Father chooses and invites, while the Son is sacrificed and the Holy Spirit sanctifies and renews); eighth, that some attributes are exclusively confined to each of the three (for example, fatherhood is confined to the Father, while childhood is confined to the Son and emanation is confined to the Holy Spirit).¹

According to this Christian author, the persons of the trinity are indeed the three attributes of the deity. It is, however, possible to infer a different account from one phrase of *the Creeds of the Catholic Church*:

The three hypostases are separate from one another: “God is unique and one but not alone. The Father the Son and the Holy Spirit are not mere names to denote the qualities of the deity, because they are really separate from one another. Neither the Father is the Son, nor is the son the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father or the Son. (The Council of Toledo)²

In order to make the trinity doctrine familiar to the mind, the same author gives an analogy: “Although there is no perfect analogy in the world to explain this matter, human intellect can be a very good example. Human intellect may consult with itself and yet gives its opinions as to its conclusions.”³

According to this analogy and example, we are to take the trinity as an appearance rather than the essence, because the

1- Nizam-u al-Ta’lim fi Ilm al-Lahut al-Qawim (نظام التعليم في علم اللاهوت القويم), Vol.

1, P. 211

2 - CCC, P. 60

3 - Elahiyyat Masihi (الاهيات مسيحي), P.

consultation and conclusions of the intellect do not entail a real distinction in the faculty of the intellect. This is a point highlighted by Christian theologians, including this very author. They say that trinity is not something dealing with the appearance, rather with the essence. This very point makes Christianity's doctrine of trinity different from the issue of theophany sometimes proposed in Islamic mysticism. "Theophany" does not produce any distinction in the deity. Christian trinity, however, assumes the three really separate Persons in the deity. The explanation of the trinity doctrine as theophany has been rejected as a heresy in the history of Christianity.

The followers of Sabellius hold that God has manifested Himself in trinity, but in essence is not of trinity. They believe that God as the Father is the creator and legislator, and as the Son, i.e. the embodied god, has come for the redemption of man, and as the Holy Spirit brings about the acceptance of redemption and sanctification of the faithful. They thus believe in *prima facie* trinity, rather than a real trinity in the Essence of God. As an explanation, we can say that just as one single person can be an artist a teacher and a friend, or be a father, a son, and a brother, God as His theophany can be the Son and the Holy Spirit as a manifestation, rather than a real essence. As if this belief denies the Holy Trinity doctrine, for it regards trinity as an appearance by which God manifested Himself in those forms.¹

What has been said so far is an example of the efforts made by Christian theologians to explain the doctrine of trinity. The significant point, however, is that Christian scholars have confessed that this doctrine is one of the divine mysteries that no human is able to decipher and understand. Some phrases suggest that, as this doctrine is subtle and too complicated to explain, ordinary Christians are required to accept it without explanation.² Other phrases, nevertheless, suggest that the human intellect fails to understand it, and human language is too narrow to express it.³

1 - Ibid., P. 88; and see: Nizam-u al-Ta'lim fi Ilm al-Lahut al-Qawim (نظام التعليم في علم اللاهوت القويم), Vol. 1, P. 216

2 - W. Montgomery Watt, *Islam and Christianity Today*, P. 4

3 - Nizam-u al-Ta'lim, Vol. 1, PP. 210 and 216; the Exegesis of Gospel of John, P.

The trinity was first proposed as formal doctrine in 325 AD, in the Nicene Creed. Athanasius, a figure who played a major role in its approval, himself said that the human intellect would not accept the trinity, yet, nevertheless, must bow to its mystery.¹ It is thus, at any rate, that Christian authors consider trinity to be an antirational doctrine, contrary to the intellect.²

Therefore, the majority of these scholars confess that the intellect will not naturally come to this conclusion, so that the only source for it is divine revelation.³ *The Creeds of the Catholic Church* reads:

Trinity in its precise meaning is the secret of the faith; one secret concealed in God and cannot be known unless by the revelation from above.⁴

The Christian Protestant writes:

The Holy Trinity doctrine cannot be discovered in natural theology, but rather in the unveiling of God in Jesus. By rational reasoning, we may understand that there is one God, but the presence of trinity in one God can only be understood by the unveiling of God.⁵

It is implied by this paragraph that for the trinity doctrine, supposing its consistency with the intellect, there is no way for the intellect to understand it, and its exclusive source comes from the Holy Scriptures. It is, however, to be asked whether this doctrine has ever been stipulated explicitly in the Holy Bible.

Although Bible does not mention the term “trinity,” and for the first time it was introduced by a man called Theophilus (d. 181 AD.),⁶ Christian theologians have tried to find a few evidences from both the Old and New Testaments. Among these are the following:⁷

1 - the History of Civilization, Vol. 3, P. 770

2 - Tabi'at-u al-Sayyid Masih (طبيعة سيد المسيح), P. 18, as quoted by Ahmad Shelbi, Muqaranat-u al-Adyan (مقارنة الأديان), Vol. 2, P. 124

3 - Nizam-u al-Ta'lim, Vol. 2, PP. 209-210; al-Kanz-u al-Tahlil (الكنز التحليل), PP. 9-10

4 - CCC, P. 56

5 - Elahiyyat Masihi (الاهيات مسيحي), P. 88

6 - Ibid.

7 - Ibid., PP. 88-89; Nizam-u al-Ta'lim, Vol. 1, PP. 213-214

A plural pronoun is used for God. (*Genesis* 26:1 and 22:3 and ...)

A plural verb is used for God. (*Genesis* 26:1 and 7:11 and ...)

A collective noun “Elohim” is used for God.

The phrase “the angel of God” is used repeatedly in the Old Testament and it is regarded identical with God or a work done by the angel is ascribed to God too.

These scholars agree that the above phrases are not explicit in trinity; in the first three cases for example, the plural may be used in respect for God.¹ Besides, the more obvious argument is that before Christianity the Children of Israel did not have such an understanding of those phrases, a truth testified by the Christian scholars themselves.² It is taken for granted, however, that in the epistles of Paul and John of the New Testament, the story of trinity suggests that the son (i.e. Jesus Christ) has deity. These sections, nonetheless, never talk of the deity of the Holy Spirit, and Christian theologians have referred to phrases that are not explicit in order to prove that. Sometimes, for example, the name of the Father has come in line with the Son and the Holy Spirit or some actions and attributes are ascribed both to God and the Holy Spirit.³ As it is evident, such interpretations are ambiguous. In the entry of “trinity” in Eliade’s *Encyclopedia of Religion*, it is mentioned that modern exegetes and theologians all agree that there is no trinity in the Old Testament, nor is there an explicit reference to it in the New Testament, and the so-called claimed references fail to prove such a meaning.⁴ Similar observations exist in Hasting’s *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. It suggests that the Christian doctrine of trinity cannot be found in the Old Testament, nor can the later developments of trinity be found in the New Testament, even in the writings of Paul and John.⁵

c) Trinity in the Two Testaments

The term “trinity” never appears in the Bible; its first known

1 - Elahiyyat Masihi, P. 88

2 - CCC. P. 56

3 - Elahiyyat Masihi, P. 95; Nizam-u al-Ta’lim, Vol. 1, P. 212

4 - ER-ME. V. 15, P. 54

5 - ERE. V. 12, P. 458

introduction in the history of Christianity dates back to Theophilus of Antioch in 180 AD. The roots of the trinity concept can be felt in the New Testament; it has been stipulated by for example the phrase “gifting the right of baptism” at the end of John’s Gospel: “Let him be baptized by the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.” Moreover, the Christian greeting and salutation have come in trinal form: “From Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the chosen ones in the knowledge of God, the Father, to the sanctification of the spirit, for the obedience and sprinkling the blood of Jesus, may peace and blessing be multiplied upon you.”¹

When referring to God, the New Testament has used the Greek word “Hephaestus?” which means the Eternal Creator Living Almighty Lord God. The term may signify God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and other prophets, too. Thomas Michel claims that Jesus and the Holy Spirit are never called “Hephaestus?” in the New Testament, nonetheless in John’s Gospel 20:28, Jesus is called “Hephaestus?”

The consideration of the four gospels proves that Jesus has never been explicitly called a “god” by the identical gospels, and it is possible to interpret the existing phrases of the three gospels otherwise. Even the phrase “the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit” in Matthew’s gospel fails to evoke the trinity for a mind not preconditioned to discern it. On the contrary, some phrases of John’s gospel explicitly prove the deity of Jesus, which cannot be interpreted otherwise. It is noteworthy, nonetheless, that John’s gospel was written a hundred years after Christ, namely more than thirty years after the death of Paul. It thus may easily be understood how the author of this Gospel was influenced by the ideas of Paul who introduced the idea of Jesus’ deity in Christianity. Furthermore, it is likely to interpret some phrases of this gospel in a way compatible with the denial of Jesus’ deity.

The character of the Holy Spirit is not well-defined in the New Testament. The reported phrases claiming the deity of the Holy Spirit convey no explicit meaning as to the issue. It is seemingly because of

1 - The first epistle of Peter, 2/1:1

the ambiguous character of the third Person that after proving the deity of the second Person, the Council of Nicaea went first to explain the deity of the Holy Spirit¹.

d) Trinity in the Glorious Qur'an

- I. From among the clear teachings of the Qur'an is the Qur'anic emphasis on monotheism and the denial of God as being a son or having a son. This truth is openly stipulated in the chapter of al-Ikhlās:

Say, 'He is Allah, the One. Allah is *Samad* (All-rich and Impermeable). He neither begat, nor was He begotten, nor has He any equal.²

Accordingly, Allah begat none, nor has He a child, nor has He an equal.³

- II. Allah has explicitly and frankly denied trinity considering the believers in trinity as infidels:

They are certainly faithless who say: "Allah is the third [Person] of a trinity," while there is no god except the One God. If they do not relinquish what they say, there shall befall the faithless among them a painful punishment.⁴

Another verse reads:

O People of the Book! Do not exceed the bounds in your religion, and do not attribute anything to Allah except the truth. The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only an apostle of Allah, and His Word that He cast toward Mary and a spirit from Him. So have faith in Allah and His apostles, and do not say, "[God is] a trinity." Relinquish [such a creed]! That is better for you. Allah is but the One God. He is far too immaculate to have any son. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth, and Allah suffices as trustee.⁵

1 - Muhammad Reza Zibai Nejad, *Masihiyyat Shenasiye Muqayesei* (مسیحیت شناسی مقایسه ای), P. 356

2 - al-Ikhlās: 1-4

3 - Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Tabatabai, *al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an*, Vol. 20, P. 387

4 - al-Ma'ida: 73

5 - al-Nisa': 171

III. Many verses of the Qur'an deny any son or child for God. For example:

They say: "The All-beneficent has taken offspring." Immaculate is He! Rather they are [His] honored servants.¹

And they say: "Allah has taken a son." Immaculate is He! Rather to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth. All are obedient to Him.²

It is not for Allah to take a son. Immaculate is He!³

IV. Many verses deny the deity of Jesus. For example:

They are certainly faithless who say: "Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary."⁴

The Messiah, son of Mary, is but an apostle. Certainly [other] apostles have passed before him, and his mother was a truthful one. Both of them would eat food. Look how we clarify the signs for them, and yet, look how they go astray!⁵

He was just a servant whom we had blessed and made an exemplar for the children of Israel.⁶

They are certainly faithless who say: "Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary." Say: "Who can avail anything against Allah should He wish to destroy the Messiah, son of Mary, and his mother, and everyone upon the earth?"⁷

And the Christians say: "Christ is the son of Allah." That is an opinion they mouth, imitating the opinions of the faithless of former times. May Allah assail them, where do they stray?! They have taken their scribes and their monks as lords besides Allah, and also Christ, Mary's son; though they were commanded to worship only the One God, there is no god except Him; He is far too immaculate to have any partners they ascribe [to Him].⁸

And when Allah will say: "O Jesus son of Mary! Were it you who said to the people: 'Take me and my mother for gods besides Allah?' He will say: "Immaculate are you! It does not behoove me

1 - al-Anbiya': 26

2- Al-Baqara: 116

3 - Maryam: 35

4 - al-Ma'ida: 72

5 - al-Ma'ida: 75

6 - al-Zukhruf: 59

7 - al-Ma'ida: 17

8 - al-Tawba: 30-31

to say what I have no right to [say]. Had I said it, you would certainly have known it. You know whatever is in me myself, and I do not know what is in Your Self.¹

- V. The Qur'an has denied the deity of all angels, regarding them as the servants of Allah. For example:

The Messiah would never disdain being a servant of Allah, nor would the angels brought near [to Him].²

It does not behoove any human that Allah should give him the Book, judgment and prophethood, and then he should say to the people: "Be my servant instead of Allah." Rather [he should say], "Be godly people, because of your teaching the Book and because of your studying it." And he should not command you to take the angels and the prophets for lords. Would he call you to unfaith after you have been *muslims*?³

- VI. The Qur'an narrates from Jesus that he considers himself as the servant of Allah:

He [Jesus] said: "I am a servant of Allah."⁴

Indeed Allah is my Lord and your Lord, so worship Him.⁵

But the Messiah had said: "O Children of Israel, Worship Allah, my Lord and your Lord." Indeed whoever ascribes partners to Allah, Allah shall forbid him [entry into] paradise, and his refuge shall be the Fire, and the wrongdoers will not have any helpers.⁶

I did not say to them [anything] except what you had commanded me [to say]: "Worship Allah, My Lord and your Lord." And I was a witness to them so long as I was among them. But when you had taken me away, you yourself were watchful over them, and you are witness to all things.⁷

e) The roots of trinity in the preceding religions

Christianity, Will Durant says, was a monotheistic religion

1 - al-Ma'ida: 116

2 - al-Nisa': 172

3 - Al Imran: 79-80

4 - Maryam: 30

5 - al-Zukhruf: 64

6 - al-Ma'ida: 72

7 - al-Ma'ida: 117

observing the divine law, but later was diverted to the deity of Jesus and trinity. Paul had played the major and most important role in those diversions and alterations. Being familiar with Judaism and Greek philosophy, Paul was able to mingle some elements of the Greek culture with Christianity in order to draw the attention of the Greeks to the new religion. Furthermore, Palestine was a junction of ideas at that time, one which admitted the polytheistic thoughts from Egypt, Iran, India, and Rome. Admitting alien ideas, both Paul and the first fathers of the church could easily change the new religion making it acceptable for the Gentiles. The ideas of trinity, the Day of Judgment, and the worship of mother and infant coming from Egypt to Christianity, and the Theosophy religion which brought about the Gnostic and Neo-Platonic schools all gave rise to the obscurity of Christianity. From Syria the story of the Resurrection of Adonis, from Turkey the worship of Dionysius, giver of death and salvation, from Iran the belief in the millennium government era, and many others, all penetrated into Christianity.¹

“Kurios?”, a term used to be applied to Jesus by Paul, was the same title given by the Syrian and Greek priests to “Dionysus?” who would give death and salvation. Gentiles of Antioch and other cities who never knew Jesus in his life could appreciate him but as the savior gods. Paul would say: “Truly, I will tell you a secret.” He added some mystical ideas, already common in Philon’s philosophy, to that popular theology. Paul would say: “Jesus is the wisdom of Allah. He is prior to all. Everything is subsisting on him through whom everything is created. He is not the Messiah of the Jews to deliver Israel from the bondage of the chains; rather he is the Logos (word) whose death would save all.” Having overlooked the real life and teachings of Jesus unfamiliar to him and proposing such unfounded interpretations, Paul was able to oppose the intimate disciples of Jesus whose heavenly unveilings nobody could challenge.²

These matters are confirmed by another historian who holds that Paul used to deal with the Gentile peoples who were influenced by some mysterious schools in which the quest for the eternal life and the

1 - Will Durant, *the History of Civilization*, Vol. 3, P. 697

2 - Ibid. Vol. 3, P. 698

union of human soul with the souls of gods are deeply rooted. Paul did thus interpret the issue of death and resurrection of Jesus harmonious with those ideas¹.

In *Rig Veda*, there is a hymn as regard to the creation which suggests that the world has come into being *ex nihilo*. Waters are the primary matter for the world from which a great being, unique god happy and all-magnificent, creates himself by the help of the warmth (of asceticism). This hymn is the beginning of the cosmological theory which later changed into the school of Sankhya?. There are three principles in this hymn as the following: 1) The principle of the agent who is the first mover; 2) the primary matter of the world which is water; 3) the first being of creation. The above three principles can be compared to the mystery of Christian trinity. The Father is reckoned as the first principle; Holy Mary is as the primary matter from which a being, Jesus who is "Logos" or "Nous," comes into being; and the Holy Spirit is the tie between Jesus and the origin namely the Father².

The issue of trinity and the trinal manifestation of the absolute reality is not confined to Hinduism, for its parallel demonstration can be seen in the mythology of the ancient Egypt in the trinal gods of Osiris Isis and Horus. Moreover, trinity can be seen in Plotinus's philosophy as the trinal ancient original truths (Archikai Hypostasis) and in Christianity as the trinity of the Father the Son and the Holy Spirit. As in Hinduism, Christian trinity concerns the descent of Avatar the Truth from heaven to the sensible world.

In the ancient Chinese Taoism, the trinal reality is introduced in ontology and in the hierarchical beings of the three categories, i.e. the heaven, human beings, and the earth. The perfect man, in Chinese religion, applies to the Emperor or the monarch who has the great course of kingdom (Wang Tao) and is considered as the linking ring between the earth and the heaven; this is the only channel through which the earth and human being may have a connection with the heaven. The human being, however, plays the role of a mediator

1 - John B. Nass, *A History of the World's Religion*, trans. by Ali Asghar Hikmat, P. 617

2 - Daryush Shayegan, *Adyan wa Maktabhaye Falsafiye Hind* (ادیان و مکتبهای فلسفی هند), Vol. 1, P. 81

between the earth and heaven, and the king is an example of the perfect man in a place where the active agent (Yin) and the passive agent (Yang) are unified.

Again in Hinduism, Brahman is the origin of the creation, Vishnu is the origin of the harmony and maintenance of beings, and Shiva is the origin of the destruction or annihilation of creatures and beings. As regards cosmology, they are of the same rank and fundamentally they are one, while Christian trinity puts a particular emphasis on the Person of Jesus¹.

1- The Analysis of Monotheism

The principle of unity (monotheism) is the most significant and fundamental one in the Islamic ideology. There is a long and extensive discussion on monotheism; however, we shall propose the abstract of that here and in the final conclusion it is demonstrated that not only it has reached its climax as an Islamic principle, but also all revealed religions are based on it.

i. Semantics

a) Etymological semantics

In Arabic language, *tawhid* is constructed on the pattern of *taf'īl* (تفعيل) as a verbal mode, from the root of (*wahada*). One of the meanings of this verbal mode is “to consider somebody or something having some feature”. For example, *ta'zīm* (تعظيم) means to consider somebody or something great, *takfīr* (تكفير) means to consider somebody an infidel. Accordingly, *tawhid* means to consider somebody one.

It is noteworthy, nonetheless, although the Qur'an is replete with many monotheistic contents, the infinitive mode of *tawhid* and its derivations are hardly used in the Qur'an, rather it has used other phraseology to express this principle. Instead, the infinitive mode of *tawhid* and its derivations are frequently used in Islamic traditions.

1 - Ibid.

b) Technical semantics

As a technical term, tawhid has a very extensive meaning. It is thus necessary first to set forth all categories of tawhid and then to give its definition. Here, nevertheless, we may offer a general meaning and that is: "An undoubted belief in the oneness of Allah in His Essence attributes and actions and following this belief in practice."

ii. Different categories of unity in theology

In Islamic ideology, unity has different kinds and categories to be mentioned here in brief.

a) Theoretical and practical unities

Theoretical unity is that we in our mind believe in the absolute oneness of Allah and His affairs. As it were, it is to undoubtedly believe that Allah is absolutely one in His Essence, attributes, and actions. Did this belief put down roots in one's heart, it gives a divine tone to human deeds and creeds, that is his actions would change into monotheistic ones. At this stage, he would step in the practical sphere of monotheism. Therefore, by practical unity we mean monotheistic practice and behavior; i.e. in one's dealing with God, one is expected to behave as the monotheistic ideology requires. "Monotheism in worship", for example, is one of the categories of practical unity.

b) Unity of Essence

Unity of Essence, in the common usage, means¹ that the Essence of Allah is absolutely one, second to none, has no equal, no parallel, no peer or partner. Unity of Essence is still used in a more extensive sense, which in addition to the above meaning, includes the absolute simplicity of the Essence letting no composition in it. In this broad

1 - Ja'far Subhani, al-Ilahiyyat ala Huda al-Kitab-i wa al-Sunna wa al-Aql (الإلهيات على هدى الكتاب و السنة و العقل), PP. 11-32

view, unity of Essence contains two issues:

That the Essence of God is absolutely simple allowing for no composition. This side of unity indeed equals the denial of any multiplicity within the Essence.

That the Essence is unique with no parallel or partner. This side of unity equals the denial of plurality outside the Essence, which means there is no divine essence but the Divine Essence.

As it is seen, it is possible to call the former side as the “denial of composition” and the latter as the “denial of plurality” from God. Referring to some traditions and verses of the Qur’an, Some theologians have called the former side as the “Unity of the One” or “the absolute Unity” (توحيد احدى) and the latter as the “Unity of oneness” or “the numerical unity” (توحيد واحدی). The more precise sense of unity of Essence, of course, is that not only is the Essence not compound or plural, but also it is not possible for the Essence to be compound or plural at all.

The first argument, the denial of composition (Unity-of-the-One argument): if God is a necessary being, then many gods are to be necessary beings for they all share the characteristic of being necessary. Moreover, the assumption of plurality implies some sort of distinction among those gods. When, for example, we talk of two books, besides their being common in the concept of book, one must be distinguishable and different from the other in some aspect (for example, color, space, volume, contents and the like). Accordingly, the plurality of gods implies that besides their being common in the concept of “necessary being”, these gods must be distinguishable and different from one another for they are two or even more. As a result, each one of these gods must have something in common (point of similarity) and a difference (point of distinction). So, it entails the composition of each essence of at least two parts: 1) the common part which is shared by all; and 2) the peculiarity part which is exclusive of each. This leads to the composition of the Essence which we have already proved that it is too immaculate to be compound.

The second argument, the denial of plurality (Unity-of-oneness argument): this is an argument known as the “mutual hindrance”. There are a few different accounts of it one of which is as follows:

If we suppose at least two gods, there are three impossible alternatives:

When clash of wills, only one of them is able to hinder the other from doing his will, but the other one is not able to do so. In that case, it is evident that the former is the real God, rather than the

latter one whose will is defeated.
Both are able to hinder the other from doing his will.
None is able to hinder the other from doing his will.

The last two alternatives are in no way compatible with our presupposition in the if-clause, namely, with the supposition of two gods. Because the second alternative implies the defeat of the wills of gods, and the third one implies the inability of each god to defeat the will of the other god; and these two meanings “defeating God’s will” and “inability to defeat god’s will” are not compatible with the “necessity of God’s being”. Hence, these two alternatives are unsound, and because there is no other alternative, then the plurality of gods is totally false.

It is worthy of note that the unity of Essence with its two meanings “Unity of the One” and “Unity of oneness” are both approved by the verse of al-Ikhlās, for “He is Allah, the One” denies the composition; and “nor has He any equal” denies plurality.

c) Unity of attributes

Unity of attributes means that the Essence and divine attributes are different in concept but one identical entity in reality. As a result, the concept of Essence is different from the concept of each attribute, such as omniscient and omnipotent. In reality, however, they all exist in one identical absolute and infinite reality.

It is noteworthy that the unity of attribute discussion is confined to the attributes of the essence (vis-à-vis those of action), and to the positive attributes (vis-à-vis the negative ones). Accordingly, unity of attributes is reduced to three principles:

That the Essence and divine attributes are different in their concepts;

That the Essence and each of the attributes of essence are one identical single entity in their objective reality.

That all attributes of essence are one identical single entity in their objective reality, however, they differ one from another in their concepts.

A slight attention, of course, would prove that the third principle is implied by the second, for it is evident that were a few things identical with one other thing, they themselves would be identical; i.e. it is impossible for a few things different from one thing to be

identical one with another. Thus, that the Essence is identical with the attributes evidently entails the identity of the attributes one with another. Nonetheless, this third principle is proposed separately for the sake of emphasis.

One argument for the unity of attributes is that, firstly the absolute perfection of God requires Him to have His attributes in the most perfect way; and secondly having attributes in the most perfect way necessitates the essence having its attributes by itself and with no need in an attribute from outside the essence. Consequently, the absolute perfection of God necessitates His Essence having His attributes with no need in an attribute from outside¹.

What was said so far was the Shiite view on the unity of attributes. There are, however, other views on the issue². Asharites, for example, believe that attributes are other than the Essence and that the attributes are eternal. Karramiya school holds that the attributes are other than the essence and the attributes, on the contrary, are temporal. And some Mutazilite theologians believe that the attributes act on behalf of the Essence³.

d) Unity in creation

Unity in creation is one of the subdivisions of unity in action. This unity means that God Almighty is the only independent and real creator of the whole creation. The creation of all agents other than God does but extend from the creation of God, namely their creation is subordinate to and dependent on the will and creation of God.

e) Unity of *Rabb* (Lordship)

First of all, let's take a look at the meaning of the Arabic term "rabb". "Rabb", in Arabic literature, sometimes means the "nurturer". Although the meaning of "rabb" is close to the meaning of "nurturer",

1 - 'Abdurrazzaq Lahiji, *Sarmayeye Iman* (سرمايه ايمان), P. 50

2 - See Ja'jar Subhani, *Buhuth-un fi al-Melal wa al-Nehal* (بحوث في الملل والنحل), Vol. 2, P. 87

3 - Ash'ari, *Maqalat-u al-Islamiyyin* (مقالات الإسلاميين), Vol. 1, P. 224

they do not exactly convey the same sense. In some usages, “rabb” applies to somebody who is the master and owner of something or somebody, so that he can manage the affairs of it or him as he wishes. “Rabb”, however, is not the owner; rather it is a corollary of real ownership. No one may independently and absolutely intervene in the affairs of another, unless one is his real owner. Consequently, “rabb” applies to the owner who cannot leave his servant alone, but intervenes in his affairs in order to manage his life.

Viewing the above meaning of “rabb”, *unity of rabb* is that Allah as the real owner of the whole creation independently manages the affairs of all beings with no ever need in the permission of other beings whatsoever. Some other beings may have the right to manage the affairs of other beings, but this right is subordinate to and extends from the will and permission of Allah Almighty.

It is to be mentioned that unity has other subdivisions such as, unity in legislation or law, unity in sovereignty, unity in obedience, unity in intercession, unity in forgiveness, and unity in action. All these categories are proved by the intellectual and religious demonstrations.

iii. Unity in a mystical point of view

The issue of unity in Islamic mysticism has a long history which dates back to the second century AH., when Islamic theosophy came into being. In the ideas of mystics such as Bayazid, Junaid, Hallaj, and Shebli, unity has been proposed as the “unity of witnessing”. In the course of his mystical journey, Sufis say, the wayfarer reaches the station where he can see nothing but the One. His eyes will change into one eye, gazing at the Real One in the station the Absolute One. In the later centuries, Islamic mysticism has developed into a better and more perfect ideology, until at last with all his scrutiny and inspection Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi came to propose the “personal Oneness of being” theory demonstrating it in his theoretical mysticism. An abstract of this lofty theory is as the following:

Ibn ‘Arabi holds that the reality of existence is prior to and the origin of everything. This truth is absolutely and purely good and personally one. The reality of existence is one but not numerically nor as to its quiddity, rather it is so absolutely one to be even free from

this very should stipulation of absolutism. The reality of existence is of absolute simplicity and is a pure existence. This pure and sheer entity has different affairs grades and manifestations, which in the presence of divine knowledge appear as the permanent archetypes, but in the objective world assume the garment of external existence. Plurality, as a result, is a matter which concerns those manifestations. The plurality of manifestations is not illusions to bring about unbelief or blasphemy. Hence, the reality of pure existence is one, self-subsistent, and the preserver of all; so, it is the Truth and the Truth is God.

Ibn 'Arabi and his commentators have offered arguments for the above claim some of which are as follows:

The first argument:

There is no parallel for existence nor is there a contrary. Truly existence is but one identical entity and nothing may contradict itself.¹

And anything which has neither a parallel nor a contrary is personally one; therefore, existence is personally one.

The second argument:

Existence is necessary, for were it not so, it would possibly be non-existent. And if non-existence were applied to existence, it would lead to a contradiction which is impossible. Furthermore, arguments of monotheism demonstrate that a necessary being is one; as a result, the existence is one.²

The third argument:

Contrary to existence, a contingent being is able to be non-existent. But existence is not contingent, and anything which is not contingent must be necessary (there is no room for an impossible being to come into being). Then, existence is necessary; and arguments of monotheism demonstrate that a necessary being is one. As a conclusion, existence is one.³

All the above arguments demonstrate the personal unity of existence in the mystical point of view.

In order to more clarify the complicated issue of personal unity

1 - Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi, *Fusus al-Hikam* (فصوص الحكم), Fuss of Isma'il, P. 93

2 - Sa'in-u al-Din Ibn Turke, *Tamhid-u al-Qawa'id* (تمهيد القواعد), P. 61

3 - Ibid.

of existence, some mystics have provided a few analogies¹. One analogy is the reflection of the sunlight on different glasses. When exposed to the sunlight, different colorful glasses reflect different colors, while the sunlight cast on all is one identical light.

Persian poem:

Sunlight is cast on thousands of glasses
So, it has passed through the color of each transparently
They are all one light; but it is different colors that
Have caused differentiation among this and that²

Another analogy is wine and wine glass. Because of the transparency of the glass and the purity of wine, both seem one identical thing; nonetheless, the intellect knows that they are two things.

Persian poem:

From the purity of wine and transparency of glass
The color of glass mingled with that of wine
As if, it is all but glass rather than wine
Or it is all but wine rather than glass³

Another analogy is one face in front of many mirrors. Each mirror reflects the face to the extent of its particularities. Thus different faces can be seen from those mirrors, while there is only one identical face.

Persian poem:

The beloved one is one, but he has set up
More than thousands of mirrors for the sake of looking
He has shown in each of those mirrors
His face to the extent of their transparency and lucidity⁴

Still another analogy is sea water which can be transformed into different matters. When heated by the sunlight, it changes into vapor, which when accumulated changes into clouds, which when gets cold

1 - See: Muhyi al-Din Ibn 'Arabi, *al-Futuhat-i al-Makkiyya* (الفتوحات المكية), Vol. 2, P. 543; *al-Janib-u al-Gharbi* (الجانِب الغربي), P. 147

2 - Iraqi, *Lama'at* (لمعات), 15th Lum'a, P. 389

3 - Ibid., 2nd Lum'a, P. 379

4 - Mulla Mohsen Feid Kashani, *Kalamat Maknune* (كلمات مكنونة), P. 41

change into drops of rain, which when get together make a flood, which makes streams which flow into the sea again. Nonetheless, it is merely one identical thing, water, transforming into different manifestations in this process.

Persian poem:

Any image evident on the surface of the universe
Is the picture of the one who painted the universe
The ancient sea when surging into new tidal wave
It is called a wave but in fact it is merely the sea¹

There are other analogies such as the presence of line in all letters and words when transcribed, or the presence of *one* in all numbers for a number is but the repletion of one. All these analogies seek to show one deep truth, i.e. one identical entity may appear in different guises. It means that absolute unity belongs to the very truth, but plurality belongs to its manifestations. As a result, existence is but one identical personal truth, but its plurality is made by its different manifestations and shadows.

Now let's take a Qur'anic glance at the issue. The term "Aya" or "Ayat" (sign or signs) is repeated about 380 times in the Qur'an, in some cases of which it means genetic signs. That is, in the light of Qur'an, the whole universe is construed as a sign. "Aya" means sign implying that something is the sign of something else. The best equivalent to convey the meaning of "Aya" is mirror; mirror is called mirror for it shows or reflects some other thing (image or picture). Accordingly, it can be said that the whole universe including human beings have only one function of displaying another being who is but Allah. An interesting conclusion of this argument is that the whole world is of no respect but a sign, thus of no function but displaying God (theophany). It is thus, the Qur'an introduces all other than God as "glorifier" (al-Hadid: 1), "praiser" (Isra': 44), "aware of prayers" (al-Nur: 41), "the messenger of Allah" (al-Ra'd: 13), "of the fear of God" (al-Baqara: 74), "prostrating" (al-Rahman: 6), "servant", "sign", "face of God", and in one word "the all-displaying mirror of God".

As a consequence, *all other than God* is merely a sign or a mirror.

1 - Ibid.

Were this *all other than God* ever to be existence, we must assume an independent perspective towards it, while that *all other than God* has no independence of its own at all. Were one to say that *all other than God* does not exist, one does not really mean to say that they are non-existent or nothing, but rather one intends to remind us of this Qur'anic lofty word that "existence is not to be ascribed to that *all other than God*", for its existence is not of its own, but dependent on and subordinate to God; it is a shadowy being or semi-existent.

Conclusion

When comparing Islamic monotheism with Christian trinity, we may draw a few striking conclusions. First is that as an irrational doctrine, trinity has received many justifications none of which may ever be embraced by the intellect; it was so irrational that some Christians came at last to say that trinity is a secret unintelligible to the intellect. In reply to this, we can say that anything unintelligible to the intellect cannot be proved by the intellect and thus it is to be refuted totally.

Second is that, on the contrary, monotheism in the Islamic pure thought can be approved and proved by different methods, i.e. both by the sound rational arguments and by the revelation or the Glorious Qur'an. The Islamic monotheism has thus assembled the intellect and the revelation, faith and rationality, and religion and philosophy all together.

Third, in Islam monotheism has been looked into through a range of theological, philosophical, mystical, and Qur'anic approaches. This shows that Islamic monotheism is justifiable, from one side, and that it can be surveyed through the above four approaches, from another side.

In a word, trinity can be proved neither by intellectual reasoning nor by revelation, while Islamic monotheism can be proved both by the intellect and revelation.

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Cloning and Religious Challenges

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Abstract

Genetic Engineering has conquered different arenas and life's various forms and caused drastic changes in them. Today, with the help of biotechnology and genetic engineering, mankind has reached high summits. One such summit is the decoding of human constituting particle which is the source of physical, behavioral features as well as intellectual power. This is nothing but the gene. Today man has known the structure, position and the function of the gene and D.N.A. He also is able to modify the structure, replace the elements, making new links, and programming on the D.N.A. The corollary of programming, combination, and regeneration of human D.N.A is the production of a human being favored spiritually, mentally, and physically. In other words, human being, at the early stage of forming the fetus, till time of birth and after, all his features, the power to think and reason, his skill, inclinations and emotions are under his control; they are also determined and produced by human being. This is calculated as challenging to religion and jurisprudence. This study is an attempt to recite some of the important challenges and answer them according to the principles of religion and jurisprudence.

Introduction

Needless to say, human achievement in the realm of science and technology has unprecedentedly accelerated from 1940 to 1990. The science of genetics has made such advancement over this period of

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time that it made great prospects for the near future. The term 'genetic revolution' and its consequences became conspicuous in human history. The science of genetics witnessed a rapid progress with the molecular analysis of genetic materials since 1940. This progress began with the discovery that the genes are made of D.N.A. More discoveries followed in genetics. This science was completely transformed with the coming of modern technology for manipulating and analyzing the D.N.A which resulted in modern genetics in the middle of the 1970s. The scope of this science and its major role and application in human life is well known. One of the most important issues of the technology of genetics is human cloning,¹ that is the technology of the production of creatures in an unconventional way. In this science, unlike the natural process in which the fetus is formed by the combination of male and female reproductive cells, a somatic cell in a female reproductive cell is produced from multiplying of the nucleus. Using a complex technology, the fetus of a female reproductive cell (before it is fertilized) is removed and replaced by the nucleus of a male somatic cell. This somatic cell multiplies the cell and forms the embryo according to some strict genetic programs. Since the fetus of the host lacks nucleus and reproductive chromosomes, the embryo will have the qualities of the original somatic cell. These somatic cells could be separated and used from human skin, muscle, blood, and hair tissues, because the D.N.A of all cells of human body are identical.²

Cloning has received wide feedback from both worlds of Islam and Christianity. It was severely criticized by Christians. Vatican announced that the production of the first cloned infant indicates a belief in savagery deprived of any moral and human principles. Francis Camp Haus the bishop of Limburg in Germany has also said that when man turns to a research product he will lose his pride and freedom and slavery will be in the air. They assume that human cloning is a gesture against religious beliefs specially the story of creation.

1. Gholam-Reza Nourmohammadi, *Cloning: Fears and Hopes*, 10-11.

2. *Masaele Mostahdeseye Pezeshki (Contemporary Medical Issues)*, Islamic Propaganda Office, Khorasan Razavi Branch, 19.

Cloning has also been criticized in the Muslim world but more often from the Sunni sect. *Al-Moslemun Weekly* which reflects the viewpoints of the *Wahhabia* group in Saudi Arabia, quoting a member of the board of scholars of Saudi Arabia in its issue no. 633 (5th of Zi Aqdah, 1417 H.Q) writes: Minimum punishment for the originator of cloning is the cutting of arms and legs, that is the punishment for the corrupt on earth (مفسد في الارض); since this is the biggest corruption on earth. On the long run, human beings will be like animals; one would be issued stupid and the other clever. This would be like a game on human beings.¹

The Research Council of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, as the highest religious authority of the Sunnis, has forbidden cloning. Quoted in Aljazeera T.V channel, the fatwa in this regard is that, "human cloning is *haram* and should be stopped at any price."²

Many Shiite jurists, with some considerations, showed a positive attitude to cloning and issued fatwas in this regard. On the whole, there are three different attitudes on this issue. According to the first attitude, cloning is allowable. The second attitude takes cloning as conditionally allowable, that is the verdict on cloning will depend on its application: its therapeutic and positive uses are allowed while its negative and harmful uses are legally forbidden. According to the third attitude cloning is *haram* or totally forbidden.

The Shia on Human Cloning

Human cloning has become a challenging issue from a Shiite perspective too. People were expecting a response in the form of official statement or fatwa from Islamic jurists or *foqaha* in Najaf, Qum and Lebanon. Islam is meant to be dynamically responsive in all ages. New problems with the unfolding of modern life arise and they call for solutions in religion. Therefore, Shiite jurists should always be ready to have a say on issues that touch human life and consequently religion. Of course, the majority of the jurists made comments on the issue of human cloning in a general way. Seeking advice on human

1. Gholam-Reza Nourmohammadi, *Cloning: Fears and Hopes*, 81.

2. Ibid.

cloning, people usually heard general statements made by the jurists: human cloning is allowed, it is not allowed, ... The technique, according to the majority of the Shiite scholars is allowed but because of the ramifications it has it is described as forbidden (*Haram*): the disappearance of distinction between individuals, lack of a family identity, ambiguity in the relation between the clones and finally disorder and confusion in this regard.

Animal and human cloning do not cancel out God's power of divinity and creation. The geneticist is merely a mediator who prepares the conditions. The raw/primary materials (such as the ovum, cell, etc.) already exist in nature. Scientists do not create the natural materials. Shiite jurists do not regard this as interference with the creation of God who Himself has given man permission to discover the secrets of nature. Human cloning is not against creation in Islam because we are witness to cases in the Holy Quran of the creation of a snake (when Moses' staff, after he is ordered to throw it down) turns to a snake) and of Adam and Eve (without father and mother) and Jesus (without father). The Holy Quran refers to the natural way of creation here: « يا ايها الناس انا خلقناكم من ذكر و انثى ... » (49:13) (O you men! surely We have created you of a male and a female, ...) That refers to the normal process of human creation, with male and female. Thus, according to this verse most people are created by sperm and ovum. What man does now through cloning is to create another human being through another method but by using the creation of God. In other words, another way of reproduction is introduced in human cloning: a creature is made of another creature already created by God. Scientists cannot work independently when creating another human being. Ultimately, they depend on a being already created by God. According to the Holy Quran, a human being is of two lives, an animal life and a human life: « و لقد خلقنا الانسان من سلالة من طين ثم جعلناه نطفة في قرار مكين. ثم خلقنا النطفة علقه فخلقنا مضغة فخلقنا مضغة عظماً فكسونا العظام لحماً ثم انشأناه خلقاً آخر فتبارك الله احسن الخالقين » (23:12-14) (And certainly We created man of an extract of clay, Then We made him a small seed in a firm resting-place, Then We made the seed a clot, then We made the clot a lump of flesh, then We made (in) the lump of flesh bones, then We clothed the bones with flesh, then We caused it to grow into another creation, so blessed be Allah, the best of the creators.)

The first creation refers to the animal life of human creation while

the final creation is the human creation, that is the creation of the soul which is of the same quality as God's soul. Scientists could not create the latter or the soul. In the process of cloning, animal life is produced; nevertheless, the soul is bestowed by God. Therefore, cloning is not interfering in God's work, according to the Shiite scholars. Man, in human cloning, is merely creating the physical part which is itself derived from another body already created by God. The human soul is a creation of a different kind.

However, Shiite scholars always consider the moral aspects of the problem too. As mentioned earlier, when one gives it a second thought human cloning might endanger the natural bond of marriage. The family system would collapse. A mother-daughter relation might be read as twins. So it is logical that the general morality would reject human cloning because it would lead to the disappearance of the family system and many other long-established values. The technique of human cloning is permissible in Shiism (*jayez*) but it is really important to ask this question: why do we want to clone human beings? The intention is important and therefore it is a determining factor in whether we are allowed to practice human cloning or not. If an Islamic government has forbidden human cloning due to its various effects, people are supposed to follow the same.

Once this technology is in vogue, it might be misused by dictators. Nowadays, very many discoveries and technologies are used against human beings and for the destruction of the world. The nuclear arsenal in the world could destroy the whole earth for ten times. There are many dictators in the world who could like to rule forever over the oppressed people. So it is reasonable to oppose human cloning, from a Shiite viewpoint, since its spread might bring disorder to human society, although they primarily do not reject it. This is where we have the secondary understanding or assessment of the issue of human cloning coming into the scene: although permissible it is not allowed because it might seriously and badly affect the society.

In the Shiite sect jurists rely on three sources for finding solutions to new issues: the Holy Quran and the tradition of the prophet and the infallible Imams, and the law of deductive logic or *Ijtihad*. So they have to search in the first two sources to help the mujtahed (the jurist) to find solutions for new problems. The natural process of making children, as mentioned in the Holy Quran, that is through mother and

father. Although human cloning seems to be unnatural it does not imply that it is forbidden in Islam. We have such out-of-the-way examples in the cases of the creation of Adam and Eve at the beginning and also the creation of Jesus. Thus the window has been opened by God which could help the Islamic jurists issue their primary statement on this issue as not forbidden (not *haram* but *jayez*). So by the primary understanding or assessment human cloning in itself is allowed.

So there is reason enough for Muslim states to allow the cloning of human embryos for research into possible medical treatments — the so-called therapeutic cloning — while maintaining a ban on the reproductive cloning of human beings.

The proposed code addresses the relationships between physicians, their patients, and wider society from the perspectives of both Islam and medical ethics. It takes into account Islamic views on new medical techniques such as in vitro fertilization and gene therapy.

Any decision to endorse therapeutic cloning could have international implications. Here we reiterate that there is a group of Shiite Muslims that treat the subject of cloning cautiously and conditionally. The ideas of the Islamic countries might be very important to reach a world final resolution on this crucial issue.

This group of Muslim scholars (those who believe in permitting cloning) use three principles, Practical Principles or *Osoul-e Amali-ye* (a set of formula used at the time of doubt) to substantiate their theory:

First Principle: Studying and knowing the subject and comparing it to principles of Islamic law we conclude that cloning itself is not forbidden. So this formula is used and based on *helleyat* (religious leave) it is said that because cloning is not forbidden, it is *halal* or allowed in Islam.

Second Principle: The second principle is *Isalat Al-Ebaha*, that is when doubtful about whether something is *halal* or *mobah* it would be *mobah* (may or may not be performed). Thus the doubtful act is allowable and permitted.

Third Principle: The third principle is *Isalat Al-Baraa*, that is since there are no traditions available on the subject it should not be *haram*. In fact, when one is doubtful about what to do or what his or her responsibility is s/he applies this principle. Accordingly, when doubtful about responsibility and when there is no reason to forbid

something, the criterion is that the act is innocent and the subject is allowed and permitted.¹

Those jurists who have allowed the process of cloning, have also mentioned some conditions for it which are as follows:

First Condition: Man and woman who give the cell should be identified because there would be no religious, legal or even customary genealogy for an unknown individual.

Second Condition: There should be no haram label which would annul the religious genealogy. For instance, if the sex cell is obtained from the seed that is the result of unlawful intercourse, religious genealogy will not be proved since it is a violation of a religious code.²

Third Condition: At the stage of getting reproductive or somatic cell, impregnating and enticing the seed, there should be no defect or mistake with other cells or seeds, or the legal parentage would not be proved.

Fourth Condition: Those who are involved in doing cloning are supposed to be expert and aware of the secrets of the process to prevent any possible future harm to the infant or human society, otherwise Islam forbids such activities in terms of reason and religion. This law is taken from a statement:³ It says when there is no necessity for an act it should not be done in case it inflicts harm.⁴

The point I want to make at the end is that a function of genetics for man is human cloning. This means the production of creatures with the same components of individual identity such as genetic structure, blood, cell, feeling, reason, complexion, color, height, and body in general. This would naturally lead to some problem. For example, there would be economic, social, matrimonial, problems and issues regarding crime, judgment, representation, executorships, surety and procuration. Thus identity of the subject or human being is

1. *Masaele Mostahdeseye Pezeshki (Contemporary Medical Issues)*, Islamic Propaganda Office, Khorasan Razavi Branch, 42.

2. Ali Meshkini, *Mostalahat Al-Fiqh*, 289.

3. Muhammad Ibn Hassan Hur Ameli, *Wasa'el Al-Shia*, Vol. 17, 340.

4. *Masaele Mostahdeseye Pezeshki*, Islamic Propaganda Office, Khorasan Razavi Branch, 56.

the first condition for the realization of such a matter. For instance, the identity of husband and wife has to be defined in terms of age, stature, color, height, education, parentage and blood group. This would draw a distinction between this individual and others.

Engineering D.N.A has made it almost possible to produce human beings who share the same blood, genes, body and complexion. With the success of this project, identity distinction will not be possible. A Husband or wife would be standing in front of dozens of identical men and identical women who are unable to identify his or her spouse. It would also be difficult to distinguish between customer and seller, lawyer and the accused, judge and complainant, and so on.

This way, jurisprudence would be challenged in terms of subject matter as well as precept and execution. The answer to such a problem is as follows:

Firstly, with the advancement in genetic engineering man has reached a level of knowledge to exactly identify individuals. This is very beneficial to law and jurisprudence by way of approaching justice and reducing mistakes.

Secondly, as mentioned earlier the result and product of cloning would not lead to complete uniformity of human beings. On the other hand, their genetic function would not be the same since geographical, cultural, educational and other factors would affect their function. Thus there is no logic which says they would have the same knowledge, functions, reasoning, feelings and emotions.¹

However, although cloning is allowable according to a considerable number of Shiite jurists, the precept faces some challenges which require explanation. This study is a review of some important challenges and brief relevant explanations:

First Challenge:

The problem is that when the embryo is placed in a woman's womb who will be its father and mother? Will the child bear any relation to other human beings?

1. Seyyed Hossein Homayun Mesbah, *Fiqh Journal*, No. 47, 'Human Cloning and Religious and Legal Challenges

Explanation: What is important is the true meaning of one's 'child'. Who is one's child? Naturally, one's child is born of one, that is one's offspring or progeny. Traditionally, a child is one born of a man's sperm and a woman's ovum. Thus two or more children born of a wife's ovum and a husband's sperm would be the children of the same couple. Another important thing is the question 'who is called mother?' Is the mother one who carried and delivered – even if the ovum does not belong to her? It is definitely not like that. We read in the Holy Quran, 'Their mothers are no one but those who have delivered them.'¹ (ان امهاتهم الا اللاتي ولدتهن) The true delivery is not merely placing the fertilized ovum in her body and bringing it out. 'One's true child is someone who is delivered and born from that one.' Therefore, the true father and mother of a child are those who have provided the sperm and ovum.²

In addition, when we consult the etymology of the words and books on jurisprudence, it becomes clear that the meaning of the word mother in Arabic (ام) is the essence of something.³ The definition applies to the woman who possesses the reproductive cell from which the cloned child is produced, especially when the sperm is implanted in the wife's womb, because this woman or wife is the mother and origin of the child. Considering the lexical meaning and the confirmation of the legal authority and absence of adultery in cloning would be enough to make the cloned child the mother's. Legally, she would be the mother especially when her child is developed in her womb.⁴

But what is the relation between the mother, who fed the sperm for nine months in her body, and the child? According to the rule of deduction of definite priority, if an infant is fed by a woman whose milk caused the growth in body and bone, that infant would be *mahram* or 'of close relationship' (with whom marriage is prohibited). So for a woman who has fed and carried the infant for nine months in

1. The Dispute, 2.

2. Hassan Javaheri, *Fiqh Journal*, Vol. 47, 'Dividing Embryo and Cloning', 90.

3. Mohammad Firouzabadi, *Al-Qamous Al-Mohidh*, Vol. 4, 103.

4. *Masaele Mostahdeseye Pezeshki*, 50.

her body that would be like a close relative.¹

The criterion for proving legal parentage is basically the fact that the infant is the result of the seed. Of course, adultery is exempted here. Accordingly, the infant which is the result of the cell would be the child of the one who provided the cell. While the form of the seed and the cell is different, it does not change the subject. What is directly involved in creating and producing the infant are the genes which exist in both; a somatic cell – used in cloning – contains all necessary genes for creation and the transfer of the qualities as a sperm does. It is concluded that the basis and criterion for legal parentage exist in the cloned infant. Then parentage is legally confirmed.²

Now that the motherhood of the wife who provides the reproductive cell is confirmed for this infant, all other legal observation on marriage apply to this infant too. After proving legal parentage all religious precepts and requirements such as the forbidding of incest marriage, all commandments related to close a relative would apply to this infant, who would enjoy a legal and lawful position like other children in families.

Another ramification which follows the confirmation of legal parentage between the cloned infant and husband and wife and the verdict that they are the parents is that the inheritance laws will apply here too and the infant will have his share like other children. Relevant verses in the Holy Quran (Women, 11 and The Clans 6) apply to the case.

Second Challenge

In juridical texts, one way of recognizing parentage and confirming the relation between father and child is that the time span between fetus fertilization and child birth should be minimum six months and maximum nine months and sometimes one year.

This meaning is obtained from a Quranic verse (*حمله و خصاله ثلاثون*)

1. Ibid.

2. Muhammad Taqi Hakim, *Osoul Al-Amah Lel-Fiqh Al-Moqaren (General Principles of Comparative Jurisprudence)*, 301.

¹شهرًا and also many traditions. But with the advent of genetic engineering² this method will be questioned. With the engineering of D.N.A it is possible that the primary seed goes through the process of change and perfecting much faster, and become as perfect human being ready to be born within a period of much less than six months.³

Explanation:

One way of relating a child to parents or one of them is the genetic and natural method. According to this method, a child is related to parents only when possessing three characteristics: 1) Child is produced from their fetus. 2) From the time of sexual intercourse there should be a minimum period for six months to childbirth. 3) Maximum time after sexual intercourse when the fetus is formed till childbirth is 9-12 months.

Of the three characteristics mentioned, the first one is basic and unchangeable. According to many Shiite jurists the criterion is the interaction between wife and husband even if by artificial methods such as fertilization, provided that no sin or unlawful action has happened in the introductory stages. Some jurists like Imam Khomeini assert: The fertilization of a wife by her husband's sperm is allowable when there is no problem involved although it is *wajib* to prevent the *haram* at an early stage ... Even if man's sperm is implanted in a forbidden way, such as it is implanted by a stranger, or the sperm is obtained in a forbidden way, the child will be theirs though it is done in a *haram* way and they are sinful.⁴

Then what is significant and regarded as the measure is the interaction and combination between reproductive cells of husband

1. The Dunes, 15.

2. Exploiting techniques for producing clones of special molecules, man could introduce a discipline named genetic engineering with the technology of combining D.N.A (Recombinant D.N.A Technology). It is a way for designing and producing needed D.N.A. In other words, D.N.A from different creatures could be obtained.

3. Seyyed Hossein Homayoun Mesbah, *Fiqh Journal*, Human Cloning and Religious and Jurisprudential Challenges, Vol. 47, 115-8.

4. *Tahrir Al-Wasilah*, Vol. 2, 559, problem 1.

and wife, and the born child will belong to both parents. The way the combination takes place is not fixed. Even the time required for the fetus to turn to a human being is also changeable. It all depends on the method, whether it is natural, scientific or genetically engineered. Therefore, determining the minimum or maximum time for relating a human being to his or her father, in Shiite jurisprudence, shows the method not the law. It expresses traditionally the natural way under certain conditions. Thus genetics does not create a problem for jurisprudence. In this regard Imam Khomeini points out:

If an infant has artificially grown before the minimum period (six months) has passed, that is the natural process has been hastened through some rays, or on the other hand, his growth has artificially slowed down; or when he is born after the maximum period (one year), in both cases the child belongs to the father provided that he is essentially from his sperm. In addition, if in some geographical areas the maximum and minimum periods are different from our area, the child will be related to the parents and not compared to conditions in our area.¹

Third Challenge:

One quality for taking social position like the responsibility of leading the Muslim society is to be legitimate, as the right to be a judge, leader of communal prayer and standing as a witness all require the same condition. So those who are not born in a legal way do not enjoy such a right. There are many traditions recited in sources of jurisprudence in this regard.²

In genetic engineering, despite the possibility of producing morally, intellectually and physically more developed human beings, the quality of legitimacy and illegitimacy has no significance in human identity. Then what is the legal responsibility mentioned above.

1. Ibid, 560, problem 9.

2. *Wasael Al-Shia*, Vol. 18, 'Book of Al-Shahadat', Chapter 31.

Explanation:

To be legitimate or illegitimate is a contractual label regarded by the legislator when legalizing laws. If husband and wife begin their matrimonial life according to legal laws and have a child later, the child will be legitimate. In cloning, a human being is produced genetically in a natural way then the resulting child will not be illegitimate. Then the child will be subject to the mentioned rights circulated in Shiite jurisprudence.¹

Fourth Challenge:

Cloning also challenges the principle of man's responsibility to God. Responsibility follows servitude which is materialized when man sees himself possessed by God who has bestowed upon him his being and creation. But when genetic engineering owns the act of creation, man then will replace God. The corollary is that when man assumes that he is not created by God he will not obey God. With the rejection of servitude responsibility will lose its meaning. Then human beings will not feel responsible or responsive before God. All religious precepts will lose their significance and function. Furthermore, there will be no answer to all commands and forbidding appearing in the holy books.

Explanation:

Scientific and genetic advances in the field of cloning especially human cloning could never question God as creator. What is done is not of the nature of God's creation, although it could parallel the divine creations. But it could never interfere with it. Because the science of genetics depends on earlier existence of stem and reproductive cells and the genetic map with chemical, biochemical, and biological qualities and laws. None of them are man-made but they are located within the framework of God's creative arena of science and power. Human achievement in this respect is the

1. Seyyed Hossein Homayoun Mesbah, *Fiqh Journal*, 'Human Cloning and Religious and Jurisprudential Challenges', Vol. 47, 138-43.

recognition of laws governing these life units which reflect their function and biological identity. Based on this recognition, scholars and engineers of genetics are able to make changes and combinations in stem cells and reproductive cells, and ultimately design and offer special programs in the interaction between biological units.¹

Geneticists could not do anything without the fetus cell and the laws governing it, the absence of a mature cell from another organ as well as its genetic map with all its characteristics and capabilities. They cannot create, that is bring to being, the zeugma cell with all its information, the D.N.A of tissue cell with all they contain of information and delicacies, or the stem cell. They merely use the modern advanced technology to discover the laws, characteristics, and their capabilities, and based on them they re-combine and program them.

Fifth Challenge

Does cloning smear the position observed by the Holy Quran for a human being? (و لقد كرمنا بني آدم)² If cloning is possible and allowable what ways should be adopted for preserving human dignity? God has facilitated human beings with this dignity and superiority. Therefore if human beings are born in an unnatural way, and since the term 'human being' (بني آدم) mostly refers to those born naturally, conventionalizing the new method of cloning will hinder God's will regarding human beings. Such an act then would be *haram*.

Explanation:

Firstly, what is intended by the dignity God has given to man is the reason and intellect given to them for reaching perfection. Thus cloning will not waste this God-given dignity, because it is bestowed on the cloned individual who is the offspring of human being.³

Secondly, God's intention in the verse ostensibly is that God has

1. Ibid, 140-43.

2. Isra', verse 70.

3. Hassan Javaheri, *Fiqh Journal*, 'Dividing Embryo and Cloning', 98.

preferred this group to others. Thus this superiority over other creatures is fixed. It does not make this superiority exclusive for human beings born in the conventional way; it only is fixed for this group.¹ What is meant is human species whether conventionally born or born in a different way like cloning. Therefore, this challenge, like earlier ones, is no reason to make cloning forbidden or *haram*.

Conclusion

After consulting the original elements and principles of inference which are God's Book and the Prophet's Sunna (tradition) no convincing reason could be found to forbid cloning. So it is believed that human cloning is legal and allowable but the point that utilizing it on a large scale could have some ramifications in the society should also be kept in mind. Then some limitations should be set. However, this group of Shiite scholars says that cloning by itself is legal pointing out that after inspecting legal principles in inference no valid reason was found to make it *haram*. Thus according to the Quranic verse nobody is allowed to judge whether something is *haram* or *halal* without legal documentation. (ولا تقولوا لما تصف السنتكم الكذب هذا حلال و هذا)² (حرام)

On the other hand, this act does not mix up lineage or put an end to the family system. The cloned child would be the child of a man who has contributed the nucleus of his somatic cell. Like his other children, the cloned one also would inherit his father. If he is from the nucleus of a woman's cell he would be her child and inherit from her like her other children. Here neither lineage is violated nor family system is abolished nor is the social system harmed.³

Lineage or parentage would be violated in case a cell nucleus bank is established, and the owner of the cell's nucleus from which a woman is pregnant is not known.⁴ Jurisprudents who have allowed cloning all have the same opinion that when cloning is done on a

1. Mohammad Momen, *Fiqh Journal*, Vol. 46, 40.

2. Nahl, 116.

3. Ayatollah Jannati, *Fiqh Journal*, No. 46, 16.

4. Ibid, 17.

massive scale it would have dire consequences. However, when it is carried out on a small scale it would have no corollary.

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ



پژوهش‌های فلسفی-کلامی

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بر اساس مجوز شماره ۳/۲۹۱۰/۵۳۳ مورخه ۸۴/۵/۵ کمیسیون بررسی نشریات علمی کشور وزارت علوم، تحقیقات و فناوری درجه علمی-پژوهشی به فصلنامه پژوهش‌های فلسفی-کلامی دانشگاه قم اعطا شد.

فصلنامه علمی - پژوهشی دانشگاه قم

زیر نظر معاونت پژوهشی

سال سیزدهم، شماره اول

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